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Abstract
We use a novel high-frequency, municipality-level dataset to examine the impact of land
reform on rural conflict in 1930s Spain, a classical example of property rights reform in a de-
veloping economy. We distinguish between types of implementation and consider five types
of conflicts: land invasions, peasant strikes, clashes, petty theft and attacks on landowner
assets. By performing a differences-in differences regression analysis, we document three
main results. First, overall, land reform only increased the number of reported petty thefts,
lasting around two years, followed by a reversion to pre-reform levels. Second, the effects
of land reform depend on its implementation. A technical implementation was conducive, if
anything, to fewer conflicts (clashes and attacks). In contrast, a more political implemen-
tation (which gave, on average, less land per peasant) increased reported petty thefts and,
to a lower extent, attacks on owners’ assets. Third, we provide suggestive evidence that the
fall in income of settlers (the, a priori, beneficiaries) explains the increase in social conflict.
Our results highlight the importance of the design and implementation of social policies,
especially in the context of an agrarian economy.
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1 Introduction
There exists a general consensus that well defined property rights are important for economic
development (Soto, 2001; Auerbach and Azariadis, 2015; Besley and Ghatak, 2010). In most
agrarian economies, well defined individual property rights on land determine investment and
productivity growth (Besley, 1995; Besley et al., 2016; Besley and Burgess, 2000; Goldstein and
Udry, 2008; Ho, 2021; Bellemare et al., 2020; Fenske, 2011; Firmin-Sellers and Sellers, 1999;
Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau, 2002). In this context, policymakers regard land reforms,
which provide tenure security and decrease ambiguous ownership claims, as valuable instru-
ments to improve rural areas’ economic performance. Indeed, land reform may reduce peasant
underemployment, increase investment, and intensify the use of land (Lipton, 2009).
However, it is often the case that land reforms are associated with increases in social conflicts,
which reduces their productivity-enhancing benefits (Mason (1998); Albertus (2021); Alston,
Libecap and Mueller (2000); Simmons (2004)). Often, land reforms also aim at reducing rural
inequality and poverty by altering the existing distribution of property rights. Since land is an
immobile, illiquid asset, the owners of land and the landless have strong incentives to fight for
this asset (Boix, 2008). Moreover, the potential for policy mistakes in land reforms is high and
their deployment typically falls short of objectives (Hirschman, 1963; Bardhan and Mookherjee,
2010; Albertus, 2015; Albertus and Popescu, 2020). Defective design and poor enforcement
can increase conflict in the short run (Finkel, Gehlbach and Olsen (2015); Finkel and Gehlbach
(2021); Alston, Libecap and Mueller (2000); González and Vial (2021)). In many cases, land
reform also leads to diffuse and, in some cases, communal or collective property rights, which
the literature has also associated to higher conflict (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2011; Lipton, 1993,
2009; Albertus, 2021; Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 2000).1
In this paper, we study the effects of one of the classic land reforms of interwar Europe
(Spain in the 1930s) on rural conflict. The general consensus in the historical literature is
that Spain’s land reform fatally polarized rural areas in Spain, radicalizing landless peasants
and landowners alike and leading to democratic breakdown (Malefakis (1970); Simpson and
1The literature on communal rights and violence is extensive in Mexico (Murphy and Rossi, 2016; Villarreal,
2004)
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Carmona (2020)). We are the first to combine monthly data on rural conflicts at the municipal
level before and after the passing of land reform with various municipal characteristics and land
reform-related variables to formally analyze the impact of the deployment of reform on rural
conflict. Spain’s land reform law falls into the general pattern documented by Bhattacharya,
Mitra and Ulubaşoğlu (2019), who found that democratic transitions are linked to pro-poor type
reforms and inequality reducing motives. Moreover, Spain’s land reform was based on farm size
ceilings, was aimed to be productivity-enhancing and non-confiscatory. However, for certain
types of landowners, typically from a selective group of aristocratic families, compensation did
not exist.
We assess the short-run impact of land reform on conflict by exploiting the heterogeneous
timing in the deployment across the municipalities of Extremadura (a landlocked region in
the South West of the country, bordering with Portugal). Using temporary expropriations
in exchange of a rental payment to owners and then using the declaration of social uses of
land, land reform was quickly deployed in the region studied here. In 1933, almost 100,000
hectares were seized in the region to settle 32,500 families, almost 80 per cent of the total lands
seized in Spain in 1933-34. With these settlements having expired in the Autumn of 1935, the
government expropriated 239,000 hectares and settled more than 81,000 families in this region
in March 1936, which represented a third of all the expropriated lands in Spain in March-April
1936. In this paper, we analyze the impact of the 1933-34 wave of reform on rural conflict.
The effects of the 1936 wave of land reform cannot be studied because of the onset of Civil
War in July 1936. We will use the group of municipalities included only in the 1936 wave of
land reform as a control group and perform a differences-in-differences analysis. We distinguish
between five conflict events: land invasions, strikes, clashes, petty thefts, and attacks. The
potential heterogeneity across event types will inform us about on the mechanisms through
which land reform affected conflict.
Another contribution of our work is that we can identify two types of land reform implemen-
tation in Extremadura: the more “technical” approach carried out by the Institute of Agrarian
Reform (henceforth, IRA) and the more executive and “political” intervention implemented by
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Luis Peña Novo, the Prefect of Extremadura.2 While the first responded to local demands for
land and cautiously deployed the settlements following bureaucratic procedures, the Peña Novo
intervention accelerated the speed of the reform trying to settle as many landless peasants as
possible. Drastic policy variation in land reform across the analyzed regions in Extremadura
allows us to testing for the differences in its impact depending on the type of land reform de-
signed. For example, Ghatak and Roy (2007) differentiate between the types of land reforms in
India after Independence and find that those entailing land ceiling measures (i.e., redistributing
land surpluses to the landless), as opposed to those affecting changes in the tenancy contracts,
explain the overall negative effect of the land reform on agricultural productivity. In our case
study, we use spatial variation by type of land reform implementation to examine the differential
impacts of land reform on rural conflicts.
We perform a differences-in-differences regression analysis to identify the impact of the 1933
land reform on rural conflict. The “treated” group includes the municipalities affected by the
first and second waves of the land reform (in 1933 and 1936), while the “control” group are
the municipalities included only in the second wave (in 1936). After rejecting the existence
of different pre-trends, we find no evidence indicating that land reform had a significant effect
on conflict, with the exception of thefts, which increased significantly after the reform, before
reversing to the pre-treatment levels after two years. In all these regressions, we also control
for population in 1930, wheat yield, and several other variables -unionization rates, total area
affected by land reform, inequality, presence of aristocratic owners, presence of anarchist unions,
and yearly income per hectare - interacted with the year dummies.3
The baseline specification points towards an overall non-significant effect of land reform
on rural conflict, with the exception of petty thefts. However, these results could be masking
substantial heterogeneity across implementation types. To examine if this is the case, we include
an interaction term in our baseline specification to capture the differential effect of the political
2The Prefect was the highest government authority in each province, typically dealing with issues related to
public order. In 1932, the two provinces of the region of Extremadura -Badajoz and Cáceres- were put together
under one prefecture.
3We prefer this specification to a regression with municipal fixed effects because we can interact the time-
invariant characteristics with year dummies and explore the change in the impacts of these variables over time.
The regressions with municipal fixed effects give very similar results.
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implementation. We find that the results substantially change once we differentiate between the
type of implementation (IRA-led vs. those implemented by Peña Novo). In the municipalities
treated with the more “technical” IRA-led reform, petty thefts are no longer significant in
the treatment period and, if anything, the reform helped decrease social conflict. In contrast,
the municipalities that experienced the political, top-down implementation display significantly
higher levels of thefts and, to a lower extent, attacks and clashes. These results highlight the
importance of taking into consideration the type of implementation in the analysis.
Finally, we report evidence in favor of the hypothesis that a decline in income of the benefi-
ciaries of the land reform generated rural conflict. We proceed in two ways. First, we show that
the number (and ratio) of settlers explains social conflict, which suggests that insiders (the peas-
ants getting land, instead of the excluded ones) were causing social conflict. Then, we document
the positive effect of the number of settlers per expropriated hectare on social conflict. Our
interpretation is that in municipalities intervened by the Prefect, peasants received insufficient
amounts of land, which represented a negative income shock and led to an increased number of
petty crimes (e.g., steal fruits or harvested wheat) and attacks on trees, agricultural machinery
and other landowner assets (in many cases, to artificially increase the demand for rural labor).
This suggests that a defective implementation of land reform rather than redistribution per
se, or the resistance of landowners, explains the short run increase in conflict. This would be
consistent with explanations of the failure of reform based on insufficient land to settle all the
landless peasants (Carmona and Simpson (2015); Simpson and Carmona (2017)).
Related Literature Our work relates to the vast literature on property rights and conflict,
especially in the case of property rights on land (Gonzalez et al., 2012). To existing studies on
Latin America and Africa, we add the case of settlements of landless peasants in an interwar
Western agrarian economy. The fact that these settlements were temporary generated “diffuse”
and contested property rights. Although by no means a general rule, diffuse property rights have
been connected to greater levels of conflict and violence (Andre and Platteau (1998); Alston,
Libecap and Mueller (2000); Dell (2012); Fenske (2014); Murphy and Rossi (2016); Castañeda-
Dower and Pfutze (2015); Fetzer and Marden (2017); Castañeda-Dower and Pfutze (2020)).
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Our results point at the role of more executive reforms in intensifying conflict, compared to
more bureaucratic, less litigious land reforms.
We also contribute to the literature on the deployment of public policies in developing,
agrarian economies and its impacts (Hirschman (1963); Scott (1998); Williams (2017)). In par-
ticular, we focus on the deployment of large-scale, re-distributive policies in agrarian economies
(Bardhan and Mookherjee (2010, 2017); Albertus (2015); Kung, Wu and Wu (2012); Jörgensen
(2006). In this literature, land reforms often fall short of their objectives, in many cases for lack
of political will, insufficient budgets, poor information, or resistance by owners of land. Our
paper addresses the costs of fast-tracking land reforms, increasing litigation and contestation of
property rights.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the short-run and long-run effects of agricultural
reforms. This literature stresses the very negative effects of collectivist land reforms as opposed
to more individualistic reforms (Dell (2012); Lin (1990); Naumenko (2021); Castañeda Dower
and Markevich (2018)). In the case of land reforms granting individual property rights, it also
points at the potentially disruptive impacts on rural capital and labor markets, in turn reducing
the incomes of poor peasants (Ramseyer (2015); Guinnane and Miller (1997)). By looking at
different types of implementation and conflicts, our results are consistent with the view that
poorly designed land reform might reduce the incomes of reform beneficiaries in the short run,
triggering an increase in some types of conflicts. It also points at the costs of diffuse property
rights typical of more collectivist land reforms.
Our paper has implications for the historical literature on the determinants of democracy
and dictatorship in interwar Europe and, in particular, in Spain. Luebbert (1991) considered
the role of land reform in generating social-democratic or authoritarian majoritarian coalitions
in the 1920s and 1930s, which in turn explains the survival or collapse of democracies emerging
after WWI. Gerschenkron (1966) argued that the inability to expropriate Prussian Junkers at
the end of WW1 paved the way to dictatorship in Germany. In the case of Spain, land reform has
been linked to democratic collapse, authoritarian reaction, revolution, and civil war (Malefakis
(1970); Simpson and Carmona (2020)). In our study, we find that the impacts of land reform
on peasant collective action were modest and uneven. These results shed light on the role of
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top-down, politically-driven policy implementation in comparison with more technical policy
implementations, which are less conducive to conflict.
Finally, although we lack granular quantitative evidence on investment and productivity
trends, our results have implications for the debate on property rights definitions and broad
economic development (see, for example, Soto (2001) or the reviews in Besley and Ghatak
(2010) and Auerbach and Azariadis (2015)). In particular, well-defined property rights on land
have been connected to agrarian development and has been shown to reduce poverty (see, for
example, Besley and Burgess, 2000) and increase investment (see, for example, Fenske, 2011).
The effects of land reform on investment and productivity seem more ambiguous and case
specific. For example, whereas Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2020) find that the land reform in
Philippines was conducive to a fall in productivity, Ghatak and Roy (2007) document that the
Indian land reform increased productivity. These ambiguous results point at the importance of
implementation, which is one of the main results of our research. Our findings on rural conflict
suggest that the technical implementation of land reform in Spain may have also had positive
economic effects beyond the attenuation of social conflicts.4
2 Historical background
Sharp agrarian inequalities have characterized Spain’s modern history (Malefakis, 1970; Diaz del
Moral, 1973). In the 19th century, while land reforms, market forces and structural change
reduced agrarian inequalities in most Western Europe economies, Spain maintained high levels
of inequality, specially in the center and South-west of Spain (Simpson and Carmona, 2020). It
was not until the mid 20th century, when booming labor demand in the main industrial centers
(in Catalonia, the Basque country and Madrid) vacated these provinces. These sharp and long-
lasting agrarian inequalities were the source of generalized social conflict and violent demands
of land redistribution, which were eventually granted by the (unsuccessful) land reform law
drafted by the new Republican government (1931).
4There exists limited evidence on the long-run effects of land reform. One important exception is Besley et al.
(2016) that show that land reform in India contributed to increase inequality. We cannot examine the long-run
effects on the Spanish land reform since it was interrupted by the onset of the Civil War in July 1936 and the
victory of Francoist forces.
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Social tensions in 20th century Spain were intense and it is beyond the scope of this paper
to summarize them here (see, Casanova, 2010, for a detailed review). However, we briefly state
the most relevant events which led to the land reform. Starting with the Mano Negra insurgent
activities in the early 1880s, landless laborers had turned to revolutionary ideologies, especially
towards Anarchism in the early 20th century and later on towards Socialism (Diaz del Moral,
1973). Landless rural laborers had mobilized in 1903 and in 1918-1920 in extensive waves of
union recognition strikes during the so-called Bolshevik triennium. Coinciding with the collapse
of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, the provisional Berenguer government, the exile of king
Alfonso 13th and the arrival of a democratic Republic in April 1931, an agricultural crisis in
1930 and 1931 brought a new wave of discontent with violent riots and strikes of rural laborers.
In the autumn of 1931, the Republican government began to prepare an ambitious law of land
reform. In this sense, Spain was no different than many other interwar democracies passing land
reform laws in the 1920s and 1930s (Luebbert, 1991). However, as it has been argued elsewhere
(Malefakis, 1970), the Spanish reform was to fail spectacularly in meeting the high hopes of the
mass of landless families, due to the inadequacy of state capacity and deep society and party
cleavages. In this paper, we will examine the effect of this land reform on rural conflict. In
addition, we will explore the heterogeneity on the implementation of this reform.
The land reform law set a threshold to select eligible farms. Farms with a size below
that threshold were not eligible. For farms above a threshold, typically 250-300 hectares, all
cultivated area above the threshold could be seized and given to landless peasants. The law
also stipulated other reasons for expropriation like farms leased continuously for more than 12
years, land illegally acquired in the 19th century after the abolition of noble jurisdictions and
land not properly irrigated or badly cultivated. After the general Sanjurjo coup, August 1932,
the law also incorporated special clauses for land owned by Grandee aristocratic families, the
so called Grandes de España, who were accused of being key conspirators in the coup. While
most targeted owners were to receive compensation for the expropriated land, expropriated land
owned by the Grandeza aristocrats were to receive no compensation. Because land owned by
aristocrats did not require the costly calculation of compensation, this land was expropriated
much faster. This is one of the margins of reform that we are going to explore in the paper.
7
Table 1: Land seizures and settlements in 1933 under temporary occupation schemes.
Land seized Settled Grandee
(Hectares) Household heads aristocracy
Province 1933 1933 land (hectares)
Badajoz 53,146 18,699 31,227
Cáceres 45,209 13,871 92,957
Salamanca 3,719 893 28,876
Toledo 5,106 1,575 38,523
Ciudad Real 4,357 1,852 11,918
Córdoba 0 0 32,986
Seville 3,843 724 26,938
Huelva 0 0 648
Cádiz 7,645 2,394 33,705
Granada 0 0 3,711
Jaén 280 100 40,728
Notes: Badajoz and Cáceres (in bold) are the two provinces in the region of Extremadura. Table adapted from
Malefakis (1970), p. 242, table 30, and p. 378, table 37. Grandee aristocratic land data from Robledo (2012).
The government targeted the most unequal 14 provinces (out of 50). These provinces were
mostly in the southern western half of the country. Although the government lacked a proper
census of landless families, it was thought, at the time, that there was enough land to settle
the approximately 570,000 landless families living in the provinces affected by land reform.
However, government plans were widely off the mark, especially in relation to the land available
for expropriation (Simpson and Carmona, 2017). By December 1933, only 24,203 hectares had
been fully expropriated and 123,305 hectares of land had been temporarily seized (by the so-
called decrees of intensification of cultivation) mostly in the provinces of Badajoz and Cáceres.
We will focus our analysis on these provinces, which belong to the region of Extremadura. Table
1 provides the relevant magnitudes for the land seizures in 1933 in the most relevant provinces.
Column (1) displays the total area of land seized in temporary occupations (aristocratic and
non-aristocratic), column (2) gives the number of settlers in the expropriated land, and column
(3) shows total area owned by Grandee aristocratic families in each province. As it can be seen
in column (1) and (2), Badajoz and Cáceres (both in Extremadura) concentrated most of the
temporary expropriations in 1933 in terms of both land seized and households settled. As it can
be seen in column 3, Cáceres stands out for the amount of land owned by Grandee aristocrats,
but there was also abundant aristocratic land in Jaén, Toledo or Cádiz.
The implementation of the law reform was heterogeneous across municipalities. In principle,
it should have been a technical reform. However, we have evidence of, at least, one ad-hoc, more
political implementation. We will compare the outcome of this ad-hoc implementation with the
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rest to investigate the importance of the type of implementation. The main technical body
in charge of deploying the land reform, the Institute of Agrarian Reform (henceforth, IRA)
closely supervised the settlements, provided technical assistance, supplied seeds and fertilizers
and gave loans to local peasant unions to be distributed to the settled families. However, the
implementation of the Prefect of Extremadura, Luis Peña Novo, a Republican politician from
the North-West of Spain, was less planned, did not follow the bureaucratic procedures of the
law of intensification of cultivation, and overrode the role of the IRA.5
The appointment of Peña Novo came at the peak of Rightist and Leftist threats to the
young republic. The Prefect was appointed with the specific aim of deploying land reform fast
to stabilize the Republic and stave off potential revolutionary threats. However, it is not at
all clear that the settlements ordered by the Prefect had a counterrevolutionary motive. The
number of spontaneous invasions in municipalities selected by the Prefect for quick deployment
was rather low compared to some municipalities in the neighbouring province of Badajoz. Peña
Novo argued that there was no time for legal or bureaucratic rigorism, as, in his view, the
situation in the province of Cáceres was desperate and potentially volatile. Yet, when we look
at the data, the situation in Badajoz looked far more unstable. For example, this province had
one of the most important bouts of violence (in Castilblanco, December 1931), which had a
powerful impact on public opinion (Trullen Floŕıa (2015)).
As explained above, we will use the Peña Novo settlements to assess the effects of different
types of land reform intervention, the more “political” Peña Novo interventions and the more
technical interventions of the IRA. Historical records show that there was a growing tension
between the Prefect and the technical personnel of IRA (Riesco, 2005: 189). While the Institute
insisted on a cautious deployment of reform following the law, Peña Novo pressured the minister
5In December 1932, the government appointed Luis Peña Novo, previously the Prefect of the province of
Cáceres (May 1931-August 1932) and later in the province of Seville (August 1932-9 December 1932), the general
prefect in the region of Extremadura (Gaceta de Madrid, 342, 7th December 1932, p. 1683). This appointment
was based on the law of Defense of the Republic (21st October 1931), which gave the minister of the Interior the
capacity to appoint delegates in two or more provinces to enforce the law of defense of the Republic, applying
special measures to groups or individuals both on the Right and the Left which conspired against the Republican
regime organizing coups or revolutionary attempts. In Seville, there had been an attempted coup by the Rightist
police and military groups and an anarchist plot of coordinated insurrectional activities. Peña Novo had been
appointed as Prefect of Seville after the failed general Sanjurjo coup (starting in this city) and several anarchist
insurrectionary attempts in the province.
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of Agriculture to accelerate reform as much as possible. In the view of Peña Novo, in absence
of quick reform, the landless would have invaded the lands in January 1933. The inspectors
and technical personnel of the IRA insisted that the acceleration of reform in the Prefect-
initiated settlements, “as bureaucratic procedures were not followed, created a difficult and
unstable position.” According to these sources, in the municipalities intervened by the Prefect
“the number of legal claims attended by the technical personnel is the same as the number of
settlements” (Riesco, 2005: 193), suggesting the existence of costly litigation associated with
the settlements sponsored by the Prefect.
The initial wave of temporary settlements in late 1932 and early 1933 were to expire in
September 1934. Leftist parties had lost the general election of November 1933 and the Republic
took a more rightist turn, less favourable to quick land reform. However, a reformist minister of
Agriculture, Manuel Giménez Fernández, rolled over the temporary settlements until the 31st of
July of 1935. After that date, the settlements were illegal and settled farmers were technically
evicted. The historical literature talks of thousands of evicted families. However, we have not
been able to find any hard quantitative evidence on this respect, nor is there evidence of major
violent conflicts during the evictions. It is difficult to have an idea of the expectations of settled
farmers. Given the abrupt and deep regime change in 1931 and the strong emphasis of the new
government on giving “land to the tiller”, it is very likely that settlers thought these settlements
were permanent. However, there is no evidence on this issue, so, we cannot claim it was the
case.
The election of February 1936 led to the formation of a Leftist Popular Front government
fully committed to land reform. A decree passed on the 5th March 1936 reinstated the temporary
rights of evicted settlers (Gaceta de Madrid, 5th March 1936, pp. 1849-50, decree signed on the
3rd March). Furthermore, the government signed a decree on the 20th March 1936 allowing the
IRA to accelerate settlements on land affected by land reform (Gaceta de Madrid, 28th March
1936, p. 2470). On the 25th March 1936, a large wave of land invasions swept Extremadura.
According to figures provided by the IRA, in 1936, more than 80,000 landless families invaded
the land of farms affected by land reform (Bolet́ın del Instituto de Reforma Agraria, 46, 47).
Using the declarations of social use of land, 573,190 hectares were temporarily seized to settle
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114,343 household heads and their families across the affected provinces, again with particular
intensity in Extremadura. In this region, 65 per cent of eligible families were settled in 1936
between late March and July 1936. On the 18th July of 1936 there was a military coup which
led to the Civil War (1936-39).
In this paper, we study the impacts of the 1933 wave of land reform on rural conflicts.
The 1936 wave is not analyzed. We will use the affected municipalities in this second wave to
create a control group. The main reason for not analyzing the 1936 wave is that it coincides
with the onset of Civil War, which puts a severe limit to the number of observations after
treatment. Moreover, since it was almost universal in the targeted provinces, we cannot exploit
municipality variation within the region. Finally, the potential effects of the 1936 reform are
affected by the resolution of the first wave of land reform, confusing the effects of the first and
second wave. For these reasons, our study will compare a “treated” group of municipalities,
those included in both the first (1933) and second wave of reform (1936), and a control group of
municipalities included in the latter (1936). Almost all municipalities included in the first wave
of reform were also include in the second. According to our data, in Extremadura, the exception
were 8 municipalities. Most of them were really small. The only important municipality was
Alburquerque, one of the largest municipalities in the province of Badajoz. The historiography
has not provided any rationale for the exclusion of this municipality in the 1936 reform. As a
robustness check, we include Alburquerque in the group of “treated municipalities” and show
that our main results hold.
3 Empirical Predictions, Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Main empirical predictions
In this section we discuss how the land reform in Spain may have affected rural conflict. In
particular, we emphasize three different types of empirical predictions: (i) the overall effect
of the land reform, (ii) the heterogeneous effects across implementation types, and (iii) the
heterogeneous effects across types of conflicts. Finally, we discuss how we can test the channel
though which the land reform affected the number of conflicts.
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3.1.1 Overall Effect
Theoretically, there is no clear consensus on the overall effects of redistributive policies on
conflict. In most models of political transitions (e.,g Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2008;
Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), the poor fight to obtain redistribution because their opportunity cost
of violence is very low. In this context, a land reform, which redistributes resources towards
the poor, should appease them by increasing the opportunity cost of engaging in violence,
crime or conflict and, thus, reduce conflict (Gillezeau, 2015; Fishback, Johnson and Kantor,
2010; Jah and Shayo, 2019; Fetzer, 2020). However, many factors can lead to greater conflict
during the implementation. This is especially the case for land reforms, which affects poor and
rural economies. For example, poorly informed and low-capacity governments have to rely on
local collective action to deploy reform, which may give incentives to local unions to protest
or use violence to catch the attention of policy makers (Dasgupta, Gawande and Kapur, 2017;
González and Vial, 2021). This in turn implies that land reform can help organize landless
peasants, increasing mobilization and conflict in the short run. Finally, low capacity states
might not be able to enforce land reform if they face a stern opposition by landowners (Finkel
and Gehlbach, 2021).
3.1.2 Heterogeneity Across Types of Implementations
To examine the importance of implementation, we will compare the effect of the ad-hoc political
implementation of land reform by Prefect Peña Novo with the IRA-led technical land reform.
Theoretically, we expect the more executive, top down Peña Novo settlements to be more
conducive to conflict.
One important difference of the Peña Novo settlements is that they were on, average, more
crowded than the IRA-led settlements, meaning the average size of plots given to landless
families in the Peña Novo settlements was much smaller. In Figure 1, we plot Lowess functions
with average settlers’ plot size in the vertical axis and the total area of farms included in the
Registry of Expropriable Property in each municipality. Farm sizes for settlers in the Peña Novo
settlements are consistently smaller. The average size of each family plot in the ordinary IRA-
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led settlements was 3.75 hectares. In contrast, in the municipalities intervened by Prefect Peña
Novo, the average size was only half of it (1.89 hectares per family). It is very possible that other
sources of income from casual work or tenancy contracts dried up with land reform. For many
families, land reform could have reduced their already meagre incomes. This negative income
shock could directly translate into more theft and attacks, but also could have an impact on
protests. More generally, a defective land reform can reduce the incomes of very poor peasants
in the short run beyond the average size of the area. Indeed, settlements may require large
investments in buildings, equipment, seeds, fertilizers and machinery that might not be supplied
in the short run. Poor knowledge of local conditions means that sometimes plots were too small
to be viable or were located in unsuitable land. Finally, inadequate administrative capacity or
poor targeting of eligible peasants implies that many deserving peasants could be excluded from
the settlement plans, which could generate conflict among the groups of potential beneficiaries.
As discussed above, we think that the settlements of Peña Novo are more likely to fall into this
category and, thus, be conducive to an increase in rural conflict.
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Notes: This figure plots Lowess functions for the average size of settlements (in hectares) in municipalities
intervened by the IRA (blue) and by the Prefect (maroon). The horizontal axis is the total hectares of farms
affected by land reform in each municipality.
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3.1.3 Heterogeneity across types of conflicts
The effects of land reform need not to be homogeneous across all types of conflicts and this
heterogeneity may help us to understand the source of conflict. We will look at five types
of conflicts: (i) illegal land invasions, (ii) peasant strikes, (iii) violent clashes with the rural
police (Guardia Civil), (iv) petty theft and (v) attacks on landowner’s assets, typically trees
(probably a way of increase the area of arable) or machinery (as peasant unions tried to limit the
use of machinery to maximize employment during the harvest and other periods of high labor
demand). An increase in the number of strikes and violent clashes would be consistent with
greater landowner opposition or peasants looking for the attention of the government (González
and Vial, 2021). In addition, since settlements were, theoretically, temporary, we could observe
more conflicts as the date to roll over temporary settlements was about to expire. An increase
in petty theft and attacks on landowners’ assets might be consistent with a negative income
shock. Peasants may end up poorer with the settlement, if they are given too little. It could
also be the case that landowners were more willing to denounce landless peasants for engaging
in practices like gleaning, which had been tolerated in previous periods. Finally, we mostly
disregard the results on invasions because it may be endogenous. Indeed, land invasions might
have intensified in some municipalities before the passing of land reform, which could have
increased the probability of the reform being implemented in that municipalities. Thus, we will
abstain from making a causal interpretation when using land invasions as dependant variable.
3.1.4 Mechanism: Insiders vs Outsiders
One potential channel generating conflict is the targeting of landless peasants. If settlements did
not reach all landless peasants, then the group of excluded peasants could be the one generating
acts of violence. In contrast, it could be that the settled peasants were experiencing a negative
income shock (as explained above) and reacted to this shock by creating conflicts. To identify
the group generating conflict, we will use two measures: (i) the log of settled household heads
in each municipality and (ii) the ratio of settled household heads to eligible household heads in
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each municipality (according to the Peasant Census6). If the beneficiaries of land reform were
the main perpetrators, these two variables, especially, the ratio of settlers, should be positively
related to the rise in conflict. If the excluded peasants were behind the rise in conflict, the
relationship between conflict and the ratio of settled to eligible should not be significant.
3.1.5 Mechanism: Income Effect
As discussed above, if we find evidence supporting the idea that insiders were generating con-
flict and conflicts were exacerbated when the reform was implemented by Peña Novo, it is
suggestive that the income effect was driving the increase in rural conflict. To better document
this mechanism, we will consider the number of settlers per expropriated hectare. We argue
that this variable is a proxy for the potential negative income shock withstood by settlers. In
municipalities with a high number of settlers per hectare, average plot sizes were small. In the
dry farming conditions of Extremadura, farm sizes below 4 hectares were probably insufficient
(Simpson and Carmona, 2017). In addition, the expropriations and settlements necessarily con-
tracted the demand for labor and the Republican government constraint of temporary migrant
workers7 contributed to considerably reduce the other potential sources of income of peasants.
Thus, according to this income effect, we expect a larger increase in conflicts in municipalities
with more crowded settlements.
3.2 Data Description
This section describes our data on social conflict, how we measure the implementation of the
land reform and the main control variables.
3.2.1 Data on Social Conflict
We have collected monthly data on social conflicts at the municipality level. The main original
sources are Garćıa Pérez (1982) and Méndez (2015). These historians compiled the counts of
6The Peasant Census (Censo de Campesinos) was compiled in 1933 by the government to gather evidence on
the number of landless peasants in each municipality who were to be given land with land reform. The census
has been digitized by González and Brel (2013).
7The government introduced a law,ley de términos municipales, which prohibited the hiring of laborers from
other municipalities in each local labor market.
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conflict events from newspapers and Spanish Ministry of Interior sources (generally, communi-
cations on conflicts sent by the prefects of each province to the ministry), grouping conflicts
following the categorization of conflicts used at the time. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to have compiled a longitudinal database of conflict in the region, using the very
detailed secondary literature. Even though some of the conflicts are self-explanatory, we briefly
define them below.
• Strikes: number of strikes exclusively organized by peasant unions or general strikes in
which peasants participate. We use arrests of peasants during the general strike of June
1934 reported in Méndez (2015) to complement the information for Badajoz.8
• Violent clashes: includes all events related to local protests (not strikes), riots, and clashes
with the rural police (Guardia Civil).9
• Petty Theft: denounced acts of theft of fruits (frequently acorns, also olives), harvested
wheat, and/or animals like pigs.10
• Attacks: includes all the attacks on machinery, trees, and draft animals.11
• Land invasions: counts of denounced land invasions.12
Our dataset covers 384 municipalities, for 57 consecutive months between April 1931 and
December 1935, which amounts to 21,888 municipality-month observations. Our initial date
coincides with the regime change in Spain from a non-democratic monarchy to a democratic
Republic. We choose to finish the sample in Decemeber 1935 to avoid our results being distorted
by the second wave of land reform in late March 1936 and the start of the Civil War (the coup
of the 18th July of 1936).
8Méndez (2015), p. 450. We assume there was a peasant strike in the municipality if at least one peasant was
arrested.
9In “Violent Clashes” we include “Alteraciones del orden público”, “Movimientos Revolucionarios”, “En-
frentamientos con la Guardia Civil” from Méndez (2015) and “Alteraciones del orden”, “Manifestaciones y
desmanes” and “Choques con la Guardia Civil” from Garćıa Pérez (1982)
10“Robos y Hurtos” in Méndez (2015) and “Robo frutos”, “Robo frutos (bellotas”, “Robo frutos y animales”,
“Robo animales” and “Robo mieses” from Garćıa Pérez (1982)
11“Destrozos” and “Destrozos de máquinas” in Méndez (2015), “Destrozos” in the case of Garćıa Pérez (1982)
12This category combines “Invasiones de Fincas” and “Roturaciones arbitrarias” in Méndez (2015) and “Ro-
turar arbitrariamente” typically, but also “trabajar sin permiso”, “Repartirse terrenos” and “Asalto de fincas”
in Garćıa Pérez (1982).
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3.2.2 Data on Land Reform Implementation
We use information on whether a given municipality had temporary settlement to construct our
variable of interest (i.e., treated vs control group). We obtain this information using different
sources (BIRA, 16, pp. 52-8; Riesco (2005), 477-8). According to our data, 146 municipalities
had temporary settlements in 1933, 298 municipalities reported temporary settlements in 1936
(77 per cent of all municipalities), 8 municipalities reported settlements in 1933 but not in 1936,
and 74 municipalities did not report settlements neither in 1933 nor in 1936.
Figure 2 provides the spatial distribution of all categories. We label “treated group” as
those municipalities which had settlements both in 1936 and 1933 (red and maroon in the
map). Our “control group” are municipalities that had settlements only in 1936 (blue). Thus,
we exclude from the sample the 74 municipalities that never had land reform in the 1930s (white
in the map). Table 2 shows that this latter group of municipalities had very different observed
characteristics. In our baseline, we also drop the 8 municipalities having reform in 1933 but
not in 1936 (green in the map). It could be argued that these municipalities were different for
observed but also unobserved characteristics.
Lastly, when we compare implementations of Peña Novo with the IRA technical intervention,
we know the 62 municipalities where the prefect implemented the reform in 1933 (maroon in the
map). In addition, we will explore the intensive margin of reform by looking at the number of
settlers, the ratio of settled household heads with respect all eligible household heads (typically
landless), and the number of settlers per expropriated hectare of land (a proxy for overcrowding).
3.2.3 Additional Control Variables
Our database is completed with information on municipality characteristics. We have collected a
series of demographic, agricultural, geographic and political-institutional variables. We include
the population in 1930 from Spain’s Population Census to control for the effects of municipality
size on conflict (we would expect larger municipalities to have more conflicts). To capture
structural characteristics of agriculture in each municipality, we use total area (in hectares) of
the municipality, the area covered by farms affected by land reform (total area of farms included
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Figure 2: Municipalities with temporary settlements in 1933 (red and maroon municipalities)
Notes: Treated municipalities shaded in red and maroon. Maroon municipalities are the municipalities inter-
vened by the Prefect. Light blue municipalities are the control group (municipalities not having land reform
in 1933 and having it in 1936). The municipalities in green are the municipalities included in the first wave
(1933) but not in the second. Municipalities in white are the municipalities without reform in the two waves
(1933 and 1936). Both the Green and White municipalities are excluded from the sample of municipalities in
the baseline regressions.
in the Registry of Expropriable Property from Riesco (2005) and Rosique (1988)). From Carrión
(1975), we compute income per hectare in the 1920s, the ratio between large landowners and
total number of landowners, and the ratio between very high taxable agricultural incomes (above
5,000 pesetas) in total agricultural income. We collect information at the municipality level on
the presence and size of farms owned by Grandee aristocratic families (Grandes de España)
from IRA (1934: 45, 134-135).
Finally, we have also collected several institutional characteristics for each municipality.
We have computed estimates of peasant unionization in October 1931, one year before the
passing of land reform (union members of local peasant unions as percentages of the local
population in 1930, original data from the Gaceta de Madrid, 293, 20th October 1931: 426-
7). This information also provides the year in which the local union was created. We add a
18
dummy variable for the presence of the most radical anarchist unions (from Méndez, 2015 and
Ayala Vicente, 2002) and we also have information on the existence of a branch of the Socialist
Peasant Union (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra) in the Summer of 1932 (the
main source is FNTT, 2000).
3.2.4 Control, Treated and Excluded Municipalities
We now briefly discuss the observational characteristics of the four groups discussed above and
why we exclude some municipalities from our baseline specification. Table 2 reports the means
and standard error of the means of the most relevant variables for four groups: (i) settlement
in 1933 and 1936 (treated), (ii) settlements only in 1936 (control), (iii) no reform (excluded)
and (iv) only reform in 1933 (excluded). The number of observations in each group-variable
bin varies due to data availability.
First, by looking at group 3 (no settlements either 1933 nor 1936), we can see that these
municipalities are different. On average, they were much less populated (less than half of the
control group, group 2 in the table), they were smaller (around half of the control group) and
had much less expropiable area (roughly, one fifth of the control group). In addition, levels of
peasant unionization were half of the control group. Lastly, although there is a lot of missing
information from the Land Registry, the municipalities with some information on agricultural
taxable incomes show relatively low levels of inequality (‘share largest landowners’) and lower
levels of agricultural income per hectare.
Then, the 8 municipalities included in land reform plans in 1933 but not in 1936 (group 4),
which we also exclude from our baseline regression, are also special in many dimensions. First,
we want to emphasize that looking at the means is misleading because the sammple is very
small (8) and it includes one large municipality (Alburquerque) and several very small ones.
In addition, two of these municipalities had abundant expropriable land, pushing the average
upwards and were quite unequal (as measured by the share of total yearly agricultural income
controlled by the largest landowners, according to the Land Registry) and they have lower levels
of income per hectare. These municipalities had really zero peasants unionized except in one
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municipality (Higuera).13
Finally, we note that municipalities in group 1 (treated) and group 2 (control) were much
more similar. For example, population difference were not statistically significant between
the two groups. The share of Leftist vote was very similar in 1931 and the difference was
not statistically significant. In addition, neither the income per hectare, nor local inequality
(measured by the share of total agricultural income taken by those with highest estimated
incomes) show statistical significant mean differences between group 1 and group 2. However, for
the rest of the variables, the two means are different. For example, the size of the municipality (in
hectares) and the area of farms affected by land reform were larger in the treated group. Lastly,
levels of unionization were significantly larger in the treated group. Thus, we cannot conclude
that the two groups were the same, but we will control for these observational differences in our
estimation. In addition, we will make sure that the parallel trend assumption on the outcome
variable is satisfied. Given that we have observations for 19 pre-treatment months, giving 5,548
pre-treatment municipality-month observations, we have enough statistical power to test for the
existence of different pre-trends in the treatment and control groups.
To conclude, Table 3 provides summary statistics for the baseline sample (control and treated
municipalities). There are 292 municipalities and we consider 57 months. Except for the
conflict variables, all the other variables are time- invariant. The variables “inequality of taxable
income”, “Inequality owners” and “Income per hectare” have 83 observations that are imputed
with multiple imputation.14
3.3 Suggestive Evidence on the Effects on Social Conflict
Before formally estimating the effect of land reform on rural conflict, we discuss the evolution
of the dependent variables for the treated and control groups. Figure 3, shows the monthly
evolution of the five events discussed above between April 1931 and December 1935. The blue
13In unreported regressions, our results are robust to the inclusion of these municipalities. These regressions
are available upon request.
14We have performed 10, 20, and 30 multiple imputations using the Stata command mi impute mvn, which
fills missing data using multivariate normal regression, in this case we use longitude, latitude, altitude, the log of
population in 1930 and the municipal average of the wheat yield, from FAO-GAEZ, wheatyield-lowinput-rainfed
estimates. Results do not change when more imputations are added. In the online Appendix, sections J to N,
we also display the results without multiple imputation. Results are not altered.
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Table 2: Observable characteristics, differences by municipality group.
Area % % Share
Pop Area expr Union Left Income largest




N 138 139 139 105 137 108 103
Mean 3,655 14,860 7,658 .225 .59 37.27 .545




N 160 158 160 132 148 110 107
Mean 3,199 9,617 3,224 .11 .57 40.47 .513
se (mean) 374.8 1,209 774.5 .035 .024 1.73 .044
Group 3
No reform
N 74 75 75 65 70 17 16
Mean 1,503 5,327 675.1 .059 .371 30.74 .351
se (mean) 154.79 542.75 235.7 .02 .033 3.64 .054
Group 4
Reform in 1933
No reform in 1936
N 8 8 8 8 8 7 7
Mean 1,826 13,554 7,624 .049 .19 18.87 .51
se (mean) 1,185 8,307 5,629 .049 .11 5.71 .071
Notes: This table gives the means of the selected variables for each group of municipalities. The wave 1933
group includes all municipalities affected by land reform in 1933. N is the number of municipalities, mean is
the group mean and se(mean) is the standard error of the mean. Pop1930 is the population in 1930, Area
is the total area of the municipality expressed in hectares, ‘Area expr’ is the area covered by farms affected
by land reform and included in the Registry of Expropriable Property. % unionized peasants in 1931 is the
number of peasants affiliated to peasants union divided by the estimates of landless peasants from the Peasant
Census (Censo de Campesinos). % Left 31 is the percentage of vote cast in favour of Leftist parties in the
general election of 1931, % ‘Income per hec’ is the total taxable agricultural income per hectare (total taxable
agricultural income as estimated by the Land Registry divided by the total area in hectares of the municipality.
Note this is total area, not total agricultural area. “Share largest landowners” is the ratio between the total
taxable income of the largest landowners (above 5,000 pesetas of yearly income) divided by total taxable
income as estimated by the Land Registry. Population Census for population, Carrión (1975) for area and
income, Gaceta de Madrid for union presence, voters and potential electors from Bolet́ın de la Provincia de
Badajoz and Ayala Vicente (2001). Data from the Peasant Census (Censo de Campesinos) compiled in 1933-35
from González and Brel (2013).
line represents the control group, the red line the treated one. Month 20, November 1932, is
marked with a vertical blue line to represent when the land reform was approved in the selected
provinces15. We can see how rural conflict was generally higher after the passing of the land
reform in both groups. This pattern seems clearer for land invasions, petty theft and attacks.
We briefly describe, looking at Figure 3, the evolution of each of these conflicts. For inva-
15Gaceta de Madrid, 297, 23rd October 1932, p. 522; Gaceta de Madrid, 308, 3rd November 1932, p. 762)
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Table 3: Summary statistics.
Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Invasions 16,664 .019 .191 0 6
Strikes 16,664 .007 .116 0 1
Violence 16,664 .007 .09 0 1
Petty Theft 16,664 .019 .216 0 7
Attacks 16,664 .007 .088 0 1
1933 Treatment 16,664 .46 .499 0 1
Pop 1930 16,664 3,470 4,325 151 43,726
Log Pop 1930 16,664 7.706 .91 5.01 10.69
Area (hect) 16,664 12,079 17,511 360 175,033
Expropr area 16,664 5,302 13,410 0 145,893
Wheat yield 16,664 2.11 .17 1.83 2.64
Ineq. income 13,514 51.7 36.8 0.06 421
Ineq. owners 13,514 2.8 3.9 0.18 45.31
Income hect. 14,036 37.7 17.8 0.286 112.9
Grandee arist. 16,664 .47 .5 0 1
% union 16,664 .03 .06 0 .28
Anarchism 16,664 .11 .31 0 1
Longitude 16,664 39.2 .62 38.07 40.3
Latitude 16,664 -6.1 .52 -7.5 -4.9
Altitude 16,664 430.9 .138.7 188 941.8
Notes: Expropr area is the area covered by farms affected by land reform included in the Registry of Ex-
propriable Farms. Data Sources: Conflicts: Méndez (2015); Garćıa Pérez (1982). 1933 treatment: BIRA,
Riesco (2005), p. 477-8. Pop 1930: Spain’s Population Census. Area: Carrión (1975). Expropriable Area:
Rosique (1988); ?); Riesco (2006). Wheat yield: municipal averages calculated from FAO-GAEZ, wheat, low
input, rainfed. Inequality income, inequality owners, income per hec: Carrión (1975). Grandee aristocracy:
Suplemento del Bolet́ın del Instituto de Reforma Agraria, Datos recopilados sobre las provincias de Badajoz,
Cáceres y Huelva, Madrid, 1934. Percentage unionized in October 1931: Gaceta de Madrid, 293, 20th October
1931: 426-7. Anarchism: Méndez (2015), Ayala Vicente (2002). Longitude, latitude, altitude: IVIE.
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sions, there is an uptick for both groups of municipalities in October 1932. However, the largest
peak for both groups is after November 1932, especially in January 1933. After this outburst,
the two series collapses to close to zero with some increases in 1934 and 1935. Something similar
happens with strikes, there is a sharp increase in strikes for both groups of municipalities after
November 1932 but there is also an intensification of conflict before November 1932. Violent
clashes, on the other hand, display a different trend over time, generally at much lower levels
since these events are generally more exceptional. Violent conflicts were high in 1931 in these
provinces, the most famous episode being the events of Castilblanco (Badajoz), in December
1931, during which four Guardia Civil members were lynched by a mob of peasants. In this
case, both groups of municipalities display high levels of violent conflicts in the months before
the deployment of land reform. After November 1932, both series maintain high levels, the
decline phase happens only during 1935. Finally, for theft and attacks, we also see an increase
in conflict after the passing of land reform. Theft typically happened in the last months of the
year, as peasants invaded the largest farms to glean acorns and sometimes olives, which were
important alternative sources of food or income, especially during the months in which they
were unemployed. Attacks also display a cyclical pattern, being typically higher during the
harvest, normally in June.
For our identification strategy, it is important that the trend of conflicts in the two groups
before the passing of the land reform was similar. Although we will formally test this assumption
below, graphically, the series of strikes and attacks are fairly similar between both groups, and
the series for theft are also very close, before November 1932. A potential concern may be for
invasions and clashes, but we will test formally if the pre-trends are different.16
16In any event, to have an idea of the effect of the land reform we need to compare the difference between the
red and blue line. We do this exercise in Figure 11 in the Appendix, in which we only report the difference in the
outcome variable of the treated and control group. Note that values close to zero imply that there is no different
between both groups. In contrast, high values post-reform imply that the land reform increased social conflict.
Looking at the figure, it would seem that only for petty thefts and attacks the difference were higher after the
land reform. That is, it seems that there is a differential increase in the number of these events in the treated
municipalities after the trade reform. We will formally perform this diff-in-diff estimation in the next section.
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Notes: This figure plots the time series evolution of the monthly average of conflicts in “treated”and
“untreated” municipalities. The vertical blue line marks the passing of the legislation on temporary
occupations of land
3.4 Empirical Strategy: Differences-in-differences
We will identify the effect of the land reform by comparing the performance of the treated
municipalities with our control group after the shock. To formally estimate this effect, we
consider a differences-in-differences strategy. In the next section, we discuss the validity of the
parallel trend assumption.
In particular, we consider the following baseline specification,
Ci,t = α+ βt ∗Ri ∗ Yt + β ∗Ri +X ′i ∗ γ1 +X ′i ∗ Yt ∗ γn,t + Yt +mt + εi,t, (1)
where Ci,t is the number of rural conflicts in municipality i in month t. We will run this
regression for each type of social conflict: (i) illegal land invasions, (ii) peasant strikes, (iii)
violent clashes between peasants and the police, (iv)petty theft and (v) attacks on machinery
and other landowner assets. Ri is the treatment variable, which takes value 1 for municipalities
being selected in the the reform of 1933 and 1936 (treated group) and 0 for those being selected
only in 1936 (control group). Xi is a set of time-invariant municipality controls, Yt and mT are
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year and month fixed effects. We include mT to capture the seasonality of conflicts (invasions
more typical in January and February, petty theft in November, attacks in June). We take
1931 as our reference year, so βt should be interpreted as the increase in year t relative to
the reference year 1931. Year 1932 was only affected by land reform at the very end, so we
consider it a transition year, whereas years 1933, 1934 and 1935 are the years affected by the
first wave of reform (or lack of it). We estimate all the models with OLS with population
weights and we cluster the standard errors at the municipality level to avoid the problems of
serial auto-correlation in differences-in-differences designs (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan,
2004).
The vector of time invariant municipality controls, Xi, includes the log of the population
in 1930, wheat yield, the log of total expropriable area, a dummy for the presence of Grandee
aristocratic land (IRA, 1934), and a series of geographical controls. We include longitude,
latitude and an interaction between longitude and latitude to control for hidden spatial patterns
and altitude, for unobserved characteristics like ruggedness or characteristics of the terrain that
might affect conflict. Note that we also include the interaction between these municipality
controls and the vector of year fixed effects. We argue that this specification is superior to
include only municipality fixed effects because we allow the effect of this municipality variables
to be different over time. We are confident that our municipality controls absorb most of
municipality specific effect. Indeed, in the Online Appendix, sections O to S, we also show that
our results can be replicated in a specification with municipality fixed effects. Note that, in this
case, we cannot include the interaction between municipality and year fixed effects because it
would be co-linear with our variable of interest.
One important assumption to correctly estimate the effect of land reform is that the two
groups had parallel trends before the treatment. In other words, when estimating our baseline
specification we should find that β and β1932 are not significantly different from zero. As we
said, 1931 is our reference year, so β represents the differential number of conflicts between
both groups in 1931. We report these coefficients in the next section and confirm that this is
the case.
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4 Effects of the Land Reform on Social Conflict
In this section we report the main results of the paper. First, we examine the overall effects of
land reform on social conflict. Then, we exploit the heterogeneity on the implementation of the
reform to investigate whether the effects differed in both cases.
4.1 Overall Effects
Figure 4 reports the coefficients of β and the four βt from equation 1 (one for each year other
than the reference year) along with their confidence intervals. The treatment effect of the land
reform is captured by coefficients β1933, β1934 and β1935. Each panel of the figure reports the
effects for a different type of social conflict. The values of the point estimates along with the
coefficients of other variables can be found in Table E in the Appendix.














































































































































































































Notes: The figure plots coefficients from regression using equation 1 for each of the conflict types.
The first thing that we want to emphasize is that β and β1932, the pre-reform coefficients,
are not different from zero in any of the five types of conflicts. As argued above, it means
that these two groups of municipalities did not have significantly different number of conflict
before the reform. The only concern is on the coefficient for invasions in 1931, which is positive
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and significant at the 10 per cent level. However, in 1932, right before the reform, it was not
significant. Thus, we consider that the pre-reform parallel trend assumption is satisfied for all
types of social conflict.
We now discuss the effects of the land reform on rural conflict. Looking at all panels, we
can see that there was no a generalized increase in conflict after the implementation of the
land reform. Indeed, β1933 is not statistically different from zero in four out of the five types
of conflict. β1933 is only positive and statistically significant for the case of petty theft. More
importantly, the increase in petty theft was not only significant in 1933 but also in 1934. That
is, the effects of the land reform had some persistence. In 1935 the coefficient is positive but
it is not significant at conventional levels. This result implies that the increase in theft was
temporal (two years) and it returned to pre-reform levels after that. The fact that the increase
in social conflict is only on theft suggests that a decline in income may be driving this result.
Remember that petty thefts were denounced acts of stealing fruits, harvested wheat or animals,
which could be performed by peasants in greater need of food. Quantitatively, the increase in
petty thefts was .032 in 1933 and .038 in 1934. The average counts of Petty Thefts were .017
in 1931-1935, .024 in 1933 and .032 in 1934. Thus, compared to the petty theft averages, the
estimated effects of the reform are quantitatively large.
Lastly, we turn our attention to the effects on invasions. As explained above, we need to be
careful interpreting these results because land invasions may be endogenous to land reform. We
can see that the coefficient for invasions is only statistically different from zero in 1934. In that
year, the number of land invasions was lower in the treated municipalities. However, it was not
different from zero either before or after, so, we do not have an explanation for this particular
year.
Summing up, the coefficients presented in Figure 4 suggest that, with the exception of
petty thefts, land reform did not increase rural conflict. However, if the effect of land reform
depends on its implementation, this overall result may be masking substantial heterogeneity
across municipalities. In the next section, we attempt to disentangle this overall effect by
analyzing the effects of the ad-hoc political implementation of Peña Novo.
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4.2 Heterogeneous Effects Across Implementations
We now examine how the effects of the land reform may vary with the type of implementation.
As discussed in the historical section, there were two very different implementations of land re-
form in this region. On the one hand, the more technical IRA-led implementation. On the other
hand, the more ad-hoc (or political) implementation of the General Prefect of Extremadura,
Luis Peña Novo. The effect of land reform in the municipalities where Peña Novo implemented
it may be different for a variety of reasons. One important reason is that, as shown in Figure
1, the settlements ordered by Peña Novo were typically smaller, which might have reduced the
incomes of landless peasants. Given the evidence on petty thefts reported above, it may be that
all the increase in social conflict may be explained by this political implementation of reform.
In order to decompose the impacts of the political vis-à-vis the technical reform, we include
an interaction with a “prefect” municipality dummy. In particular, we consider the the following
specification,
Ci,t = α+ δt ∗Ri ∗ Pi ∗ Yt + δ ∗Ri ∗ Pi + β ∗Ri + βt ∗Ri ∗ Yt +X ′i ∗ γn + Yt +mt + εi,t, (2)
where Ci,t represents the monthly count of conflicts, Ri is a dummy for a municipality
having reform in both 1933 and 1936 (treatment group in the baseline specification), Pi is a
dummy for a municipality with the prefect-initiated settlements, Xi are the usual time invariant
municipal characteristics, Yt and mt are the year and month fixed effects. Analogous to our
baseline specification, δ and β are the effects in the reference year (1931). Note that the effect
of IRA-led land reform is βt, the differential effect of prefect-initiated reforms is δt and, thus,
the total effect of prefect-initiated land reform is given by the sum, βt+ δt.
Figure 5 reports the βt coefficients, which represent the effects of the technical IRA-led land
reform on social conflict.17 Compared to our previous results, Figure 4, the most importance
difference is that the coefficient on petty thefts is not longer positive and statistically significant
17Values of coefficients and coefficients on the other variables in the regression can be found in Table F in the
Appendix.
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for years 1933 and 1934. In other words, by removing the effect of the expropriations of Peña
Novo, we observe that the land reform did not lead to an increase in the number of petty thefts.
This result is supportive of the idea that decline in income associated to the implementations
of Peña Novo, which gave smaller areas to the peasants, explains the increase in thefts. For the
rest of coefficients, we want to emphasize the negative and statistically significant coefficients
for attacks and clashes in 1933. That is, it seems that these technical land reforms were, if
anything, conducive to short-run decline in rural conflict.














































































































































































































Notes: This figure plots the βt coefficients from equation [4].
The effects are radically different in the case of the prefect-led settlements. In Figure 6, we
plot the δt coefficients, which report the differential effect of the implementation of Peña Novo.
The coefficients displayed in Figure 6 point at the exact opposite effects of technical land reform
reported in Figure 5. Compared to the technical reforms, the municipalities intervened by Peña
Novo had significantly more strikes, clashes and attacks in 1933. These differential effects
were persistent until 1935 for the case of attacks (the coefficient for strikes is not significant
in 1934 and it is positive and significant in 1935). For petty theft, we observe the there is
a differential increase in the number of thefts in 1934 and 1935 in the municipalities where
Peña Novo implemented the reform. The coefficient for 1933 is positive but not statistically
significant.
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Notes: This figure plots the δt coefficients from equation [4].
One concern with our estimates is that the municipalities chosen by Peña Novo were in the
province of Cáceres. Even though we control for most of the observable differences between
municipalities, it could be that unobserved differences between provinces may explain some of
our findings. To address this concern, we re-estimate equation [2] only for the municipalities in
the province of Cáceres. Figure 12 in the Appendix reports the estimated δt coefficients. Note
that we are decreasing a lot the size of the sample and, thus, the power of our coefficient also
shrinks. In any event, we note that the results are very similar. In particular, the positive and
significant δt coefficients for theft and clashes survive.
Lastly, we examine the total effect of land reform in the prefect-initiated settlements. As
discussed above, we need to consider the sum of the βt and δt coefficients. We want to emphasize
that the overall effect of theft are positive and statistically significant for all post-reform years.
This is in stark contrast with the effect of the technical implementation (Figure 5 ), which
was not different from zero in any year. Quantitatively, the sum of the β and δ coefficients
is 0.036 for 1933, 0.101 for 1934, and 0.053 for 1935. The overall effects on attacks are also
positive in 1933 and 1935 (in 1934 they are significant at 10 percent). For the remaining types
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of conflict, the overall effect of prefect-initiated settlements is not statistically different from
zero at 5 percent. For example, the effect on clashes in 1933 is positive and significant only
at 10 percent. The same for strikes in 1935. For none of the years, the effect on invasions is
different from zero. In any event, it is clear that the implementation of Peña Novo exacerbated
rural conflict.
To summarize, the evidence reported in this section underlines the importance of the im-
plementation of the reform. Indeed, we have documented that technical land reform was,
if anything, conducive to reduce social tensions and conflicts in the short-run (for example,
clashes and attacks in 1933). On the other hand, the ad-hoc political implementation of Peña
Novo tended to increase thefts and, to a lower extent, attacks and clashes. Thus, it follows
that how land reforms are implemented matters to mitigate an outburst of conflicts. In the
next section, we attempt to identify the mechanism through which some types of land reform
implementation increased conflict.
5 Mechanism
The fact that conflicts were exacerbated when the expropriations were led by Peña Novo points
towards a possible income effect. That is, we know that the average size of areas that Peña
Novo gave to peasants were relatively smaller, maybe insufficient, which may reduce the income
of peasants and result in an increase in petty thefts. We will use data on settlers to test this
hypothesis. An alternative explanation is that the increase in social conflict may be due to
a different attitude of expropriated owners. To examine this hypothesis, we will exploit the
presence of aristocracy in the municipality. We note that the presence of aristocracy was larger
in the municipalities selected by Peña Novo and this aristocracy were behind the failed coup.
5.1 Income Effect
In this section we will investigate whether the fall in income can explain the increase in social
conflict. We proceed in two parts. First, we discuss whether insiders are more likely to be
behind the increase in social conflict. Second, we report the effects of the number of settlers by
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hectare expropriated (overcrowding). If we find that both (i) the effect is caused by insiders and
(ii) the effect increases in overcrowded municipalities, we will argue that the decline in income
of peasants is the main mechanism through which the land reform affected conflict.
5.1.1 Insiders vs Outsiders
When discussing the income effect, we have been assuming that insiders were responsible for
the increase in social conflict. That is, peasants received insufficient amount of land and this
explained the increase in, for example, petty theft. However, it could also be that outsiders,
who did not receive any land, had incentives to create conflict. The excluded peasants were not
a small group. The average settlement rate was 65 per cent, but this average includes several
outliers in very small municipalities.18 The average (weighted by the population in 1930) is only
26 per cent. In most of the largest municipalities, many landless families were left out in the
settlement plans. In order to examine whether insiders explain the increase in social conflict,
we replace the land reform dummy in equation [1] for (i) number settlers and (ii) ratio between
settlers and eligible peasants (according to the Peasant Census). In both cases, we normalize
the values of the proxy for the intensive margin with the inverse hyperbolic sine function.19 If
any of these two variables is related with an increase in the number of conflicts, it would be
supportive of the idea that insiders were behind the increase in the number of conflicts.
Figure 7 reports the coefficient of the interaction between settlers in 1933 and the year dum-
mies.20 Note that these coefficients are qualitatively very similar to our baseline specification
(Figure 4). In particular, note the positive and significant coefficient for petty thefts in 1933
and 1934. The coefficients are not significantly different from zero pre-reform. That is, munic-
ipalities which had more settlers had more petty thefts after the reform (however, they did not
have more thefts before the reform). This evidence suggest that insiders were generating rural
conflict after the reform.
As complementary evidence, Figure 13 in the Appendix reports the same type of coefficient
18We calculate the settlement rate as the number of settlers divided by the landless peasants included in the
Peasant Census (from González and Brel (2013)) (expressed in percentages).
19We use this function instead of the log for the presence of zeros in the distribution of both variables.
20Full results can be found in Table G in the Appendix.
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but using the interaction between the ratio of settled to eligible peasants and the year dum-
mies.21 A very similar pattern emerges. Once again, if we focus on thefts, we observe that the
coefficient is positive and statistically significant for 1933 and 1934 and zero otherwise. Thus,
we conclude that the rise in conflicts mainly involved the participation of beneficiaries, rather
than the excluded landless families.


























































































































































































Notes: Coefficients on the interaction settlers * dummies year. We normalize the number of settlers
with the inverse hyperbolic sine function.
5.1.2 Overcrowding
To conclude that the income effect was driving the rise in social conflict, we use settlers per
expropriated hectare. If there are more settlers per hectare, it means that each settler has
less land available and it is thus less likely to make enough income. We also discussed above
that there is a minimum size below which the land becomes unprofitable. Thus, if there is an
increase in the number of conflicts correlated with the increase in the number of settlers per
hectare, it would be evidence in favor of the income effect. Figure 9 reports the coefficients of
the interaction between number of settlers per hectare (normalized with the inverse hyperbolic
21Full results can be found in Table H in the Appendix.
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Notes: CCoefficients on interaction (Settlers/Eligible) * dummies year. We normalize the ratio with
the inverse hyperbolic sine function.
sine function) and the year fixed effects.22 We want to emphasize the positive and significant
coefficients for thefts and attacks. The effect on petty thefts is positive in all years post-
reform but only significant in 1934, whereas all post-reform coefficients on attack are positive
and significant. For the rest of conflicts, we do not observe any significant effect (except in
the invasion regression in 1934 and in 1935, both at the 5 per cent level). The fact that the
significant effect is concentrated on petty thefts and attacks also adds supporting evidence for
the income effect hypothesis. Indeed, as we mentioned, petty theft could be related to stealing
food. In addition, attacks also include damaging trees, which peasants may use to produce
firewood.
5.2 Alternative Explanation: Heterogeneous Landowners
In our previous section, we have argued that settlers (the, a priori, beneficiaries) were generating
rural conflict because their income decreased after the land reform. We have also argued that
this can explain the differential effect that the ad-hoc implementation of Peña Novo had. An
22Full results can be found in Table I in the Appendix.
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Notes: Coefficients on interaction settlers per expropriated hectare and the year dummies .
alternative explanation is that the behavior of landowners were different in some municipali-
ties. A prominent example is the heterogeneous presence of Grandee aristocracy. As explained
above, this aristocracy was thought to be behind the failed coup and, in contrast to the rest
of landowners, they would not receive compensation for the expropriated land. Thus, it is
plausible that these municipalities could be more polarized or landowners could resist and boy-
cotted settlements, thereby generating more conflicts. To explore this possibility, we consider
an specification with a triple interaction. That is, the reform dummy Ri, the dummy variable
for the presence of farms owned by Grandee aristocrats in the municipality and the year dum-
mies. The coefficient of this triple interaction represents the differential effect of the reform in
municipalities in which the aristocracy owns land, with respect to the rest of municipalities.
Figure 10 reports the coefficients for this triple interaction for all five types of conflict. We
note that none of the coefficient is statistically different from zero (neither before nor after the
reform). It means that the presence of aristocracy did not have a differential effect on the effect
of the land reform on social conflict.23 Thus, we can reject the hypothesis that the effect of the
23For completeness, Figure 14 in the Appendix, represents the βt coefficients of the baseline equation to show
that they are robust to the inclusion of the triple interaction containing the dummy for Grandee aristocratic
presence.
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land reform was different in municipalities in which Grandee aristocracy had owned the land.
Figure 10: Effects of expropriations of Grandee aristocratic land. Effects in addition to the






































































































































































































































































Notes: Coefficients on interaction of treatment, the dummy for aristocratic presence and the year
dummies.
6 Conclusions
Land reforms are policy tools used in several developing countries to increase the efficiency of
agriculture. A related aim of reform is, in many cases, to preserve public order and placate
revolutionary threats. In this paper, we analyze if land reforms increase conflict in the short
run, which might offset the alleged positive effects of land reform on efficiency and social peace.
We document three main results. First, the land reform only increased the number of petty
thefts in the short-run (1933 and 1934) but did not change the occurrence of the other types
of conflict (invasions, strikes, clashes and attacks). Second, the effects of land reform on social
conflict depend on its implementation. We show that social conflict, if anything, declined after
the “technical” implementation (for example, clashes and attacks in 1933). On the contrary,
conflicts were exacerbated with the ad-hoc political implementation of Peña Novo (especially
for thefts and attacks). Third, the mechanism that explains the effect of the land reform on
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social conflict seems to be the income channel. Indeed, we document that (i) settlers (the, a
priori, beneficiaries) were behind the increase in social conflict and (ii) conflicts increased in
municipalities where settled households were allocated less land.
To conclude, our work underscores the heterogeneous impacts of land reform and the im-
portance of its implementation. In this reform, it seems that one of the main problems was that
the prefect-led settlements did not give a sufficient amount of land to settlers. Settlers with
less income and constrained to obtain other sources of revenue (for example, the government
also drafted a law that prohibited to hire peasants from outside the municipality), committed
a larger amount of petty thefts (mainly, food) and attacks (for example, destroy machinery to
artificially increase labor demand during the harvest and other peak labor demand periods).
Our results are consistent with the view that the defective design of land reforms and other
interventions in agrarian factor markets might reduce poor peasants’ incomes in the short run
(Guinnane and Miller (1997); Ramseyer (2015)), thereby increasing rural conflict. A more pos-
itive interpretation of our results is that well-designed land reform does not necessarily increase
rural conflict and might even mitigate it.
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A Time-trend evolution of average number of conflict. Differ-
ences between control and treated groups of municipalities.
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Notes: This figure plots the time series evolution of the monthly average of the difference of average
monthly conflicts in “treated”and “untreated” municipalities. The vertical blue line marks the passing
of the legislation on temporary occupations of land.
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B Prefect regressions, Cáceres province only



































































































































































































































Notes: Coefficients on the triple interaction Treated*Prefect-initiated*Year Dummies.
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C Intensive margin, regressions using the ratio of settled peas-
ants to eligible peasants as proxy for the intensive margin of
reform

































































































































































































































































Notes: Coefficients on interaction (Settlers/Eligible) * dummies year. We normalize the ratio with
the inverse hyperbolic sine function.
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D βt coefficients in the regressions containing a triple interac-
tion treatment, year dummies and the dummy for the pres-
ence of Grandee aristocratic owners.
















































































































































































































Notes: Coefficients on the interaction Treated*Year Dummies
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E Regression output underlying Figure 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
Log Pop1930 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.00783∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.00706∗∗∗
(3.74) (7.00) (6.01) (5.22) (4.67)
Wheat Yield 0.0530∗∗ 0.00809 0.00373 0.0409∗ 0.000408
(2.38) (0.92) (0.48) (1.95) (0.04)
D1932 -0.00678 -0.00749 -0.00170 0.00320 -0.000872
(-0.78) (-1.34) (-0.40) (0.35) (-0.27)
D1933 0.0514∗∗∗ 0.000515 0.0153∗∗ 0.0101 0.00574
(3.94) (0.08) (2.57) (1.13) (1.44)
D1934 0.00471 -0.00132 -0.00428 0.0217∗∗ 0.00806∗
(0.66) (-0.25) (-1.16) (2.04) (1.70)
D1935 -0.00893 -0.0119∗∗ -0.00676∗ 0.0151 -0.00143
(-1.29) (-2.38) (-1.92) (1.54) (-0.52)
Treated =1 0.00979∗∗ 0.00201 0.00390 -0.000277 -0.000482
(1.97) (0.34) (0.89) (-0.05) (-0.18)
Treated=1*D1932 -0.00534 -0.00778 -0.00513 -0.0187 -0.00484
(-0.79) (-1.10) (-0.97) (-1.19) (-1.32)
Treated=1*D1933 0.00790 -0.00433 -0.00153 0.0319∗∗ 0.00998
(0.50) (-0.55) (-0.22) (2.52) (1.49)
Treated=1*D1934 -0.0150∗∗∗ -0.00953 -0.00875∗ 0.0374∗∗∗ 0.000481
(-2.70) (-1.32) (-1.81) (2.63) (0.10)
Treated=1*D1935 -0.00674 -0.000924 -0.00555 0.0129 0.00394
(-1.15) (-0.15) (-1.20) (1.20) (1.11)
Cáceres=1 0.0165∗ -0.00961∗∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗
(1.93) (-2.92) (4.40) (3.16) (4.79)
Longitude -0.167∗∗∗ -0.0192 0.00707 -0.0371 -0.0133
(-3.41) (-0.72) (0.30) (-0.57) (-0.60)
Latitude 0.998∗∗∗ 0.140 -0.0639 0.152 0.0513
(3.43) (0.87) (-0.46) (0.40) (0.38)
Longitude × Latitude -0.0253∗∗∗ -0.00364 0.00167 -0.00373 -0.00127
(-3.41) (-0.89) (0.47) (-0.39) (-0.37)
Altitude -0.0000301 -0.0000104 -0.0000179∗ -0.0000480∗∗ -0.0000230∗∗
(-1.40) (-1.30) (-1.89) (-2.13) (-2.38)
Constant 6.484∗∗∗ 0.659 -0.327 1.259 0.483
(3.40) (0.63) (-0.35) (0.50) (0.57)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Unionization rate ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Expropriable area ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Anarchist union×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Grandee aristocracy×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income inequality×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income per hectare×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 16,644 16,644 16,644 16,644 16,644
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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F Regression output underlying Figure 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
Log Pop1930 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.00780∗∗∗ 0.0178∗∗∗ 0.00650∗∗∗
(3.73) (7.22) (5.85) (5.11) (4.30)
Wheat Yield 0.0528∗∗ 0.00731 0.00376 0.0446∗∗ 0.00164
(2.36) (0.84) (0.47) (2.12) (0.15)
Treated=1 0.0152∗∗ 0.00973 0.00888∗ 0.00348 0.00369
(2.49) (1.28) (1.74) (0.57) (1.29)
Treated=1*D1932 0.000280 -0.0159∗ -0.00966 -0.00467 -0.00184
(0.03) (-1.78) (-1.58) (-0.25) (-0.37)
Treated=1*D1933 -0.0108 -0.0162∗ -0.0163∗∗ 0.0286∗ -0.0105∗∗
(-0.59) (-1.72) (-2.28) (1.86) (-2.10)
Treated=1*D1934 -0.0195∗∗∗ -0.00820 -0.0120∗∗ -0.00660 -0.00855∗
(-3.16) (-0.88) (-2.10) (-0.66) (-1.88)
Treated=1*D1935 -0.0140∗∗ -0.0106 -0.00740 -0.0152 -0.00349
(-2.13) (-1.33) (-1.30) (-1.61) (-1.13)
Treated Gobernador=1 -0.0136 -0.0201∗∗ -0.0121 -0.00342 -0.00830∗
(-1.64) (-2.23) (-1.48) (-0.41) (-1.89)
Treated Gobernador=1*D1932 -0.0138 0.0199∗ 0.0111 -0.0343∗∗ -0.00733
(-1.47) (1.91) (1.11) (-2.30) (-1.38)
Treated Gobernador=1*D1933 0.0458∗ 0.0290∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.00809 0.0503∗∗∗
(1.89) (2.64) (3.16) (0.38) (4.25)
Treated Gobernador=1*D1934 0.0110 -0.00333 0.00801 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0221∗∗∗
(1.15) (-0.32) (0.90) (3.80) (2.87)
Treated Gobernador=1*D1935 0.0178 0.0237∗∗ 0.00455 0.0688∗∗∗ 0.0182∗∗
(1.62) (2.59) (0.51) (3.21) (2.55)
Longitude -0.167∗∗∗ -0.0190 0.00707 -0.0387 -0.0138
(-3.40) (-0.72) (0.30) (-0.61) (-0.66)
Latitude 0.997∗∗∗ 0.134 -0.0636 0.184 0.0620
(3.43) (0.85) (-0.46) (0.50) (0.49)
Longitude × Latitude -0.0253∗∗∗ -0.00348 0.00166 -0.00458 -0.00156
(-3.40) (-0.87) (0.47) (-0.49) (-0.48)
Altitude -0.0000303 -0.0000119 -0.0000177∗ -0.0000403∗ -0.0000204∗∗
(-1.43) (-1.49) (-1.92) (-1.84) (-2.14)
Constant 6.481∗∗∗ 0.648 -0.327 1.324 0.503
(3.40) (0.63) (-0.35) (0.54) (0.63)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Unionization rate ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Expropriable area ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Anarchist union×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Grandee aristocracy×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income inequality×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income per hectare×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 16,644 16,644 16,644 16,644 16,644
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
50
G Regression output underlying Figure 7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
Log Pop1930 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.00775∗∗∗ 0.0186∗∗∗ 0.00695∗∗∗
(3.63) (6.94) (5.86) (5.18) (4.61)
Wheat Yield 0.0514∗∗ 0.00879 0.00384 0.0375∗ 0.00000276
(2.32) (1.00) (0.50) (1.84) (0.00)
D1932 -0.00746 -0.00663 -0.00134 0.000788 -0.00129
(-0.87) (-1.19) (-0.32) (0.09) (-0.40)
D1933 0.0519∗∗∗ 0.00202 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.00629 0.00589
(4.02) (0.32) (2.66) (0.69) (1.45)
D1934 0.00481 -0.000484 -0.00394 0.0210∗ 0.00820∗
(0.68) (-0.09) (-1.07) (1.98) (1.75)
D1935 -0.00894 -0.0103∗∗ -0.00633∗ 0.0133 -0.00220
(-1.29) (-2.06) (-1.80) (1.37) (-0.79)
settlers (asinh) 0.00184∗∗ 0.000913 0.000998 -0.000211 -0.0000811
(2.01) (0.86) (1.23) (-0.22) (-0.19)
settlers (asinh)*D1932 -0.000628 -0.00178 -0.00108 -0.00223 -0.000676
(-0.52) (-1.40) (-1.10) (-0.85) (-1.08)
settlers (asinh)*D1933 0.00119 -0.00147 -0.000430 0.00746∗∗∗ 0.00171
(0.43) (-1.06) (-0.36) (3.17) (1.54)
settlers (asinh)*D1934 -0.00272∗∗∗ -0.00209 -0.00171∗ 0.00703∗∗∗ 0.0000205
(-2.73) (-1.59) (-1.96) (2.66) (0.03)
settlers (asinh)*D1935 -0.00119 -0.000939 -0.00119 0.00316 0.00106
(-1.07) (-0.86) (-1.37) (1.54) (1.62)
Longitude -0.165∗∗∗ -0.0191 0.00821 -0.0294 -0.0123
(-3.36) (-0.72) (0.35) (-0.45) (-0.55)
Latitude 0.987∗∗∗ 0.140 -0.0692 0.114 0.0463
(3.39) (0.87) (-0.50) (0.30) (0.34)
Longitude × Latitude -0.0250∗∗∗ -0.00364 0.00180 -0.00279 -0.00115
(-3.37) (-0.89) (0.51) (-0.29) (-0.33)
Altitude -0.0000289 -0.0000107 -0.0000176∗ -0.0000447∗∗ -0.0000226∗∗
(-1.35) (-1.31) (-1.88) (-2.00) (-2.36)
Constant 6.408∗∗∗ 0.651 -0.373 0.962 0.444
(3.35) (0.62) (-0.40) (0.38) (0.52)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Unionization rate ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Expropriable area ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Anarchist union×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Grandee aristocracy×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income inequality×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income per hectare×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 16,644 16,644 16,644 16,644 16,644
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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H Regression output underlying Figure 13
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
Log Pop1930 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.00975∗∗∗ 0.00772∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.00590∗∗∗
(4.24) (5.71) (5.37) (3.69) (3.54)
Wheat Yield 0.0680∗∗ 0.0153 0.00796 0.0255 -0.0121
(2.47) (1.56) (0.88) (1.10) (-1.15)
D1932 -0.00930 -0.00693 0.00114 -0.00620 -0.00324
(-0.99) (-1.12) (0.25) (-0.55) (-0.89)
D1933 0.0610∗∗∗ -0.00162 0.0122∗ 0.00208 0.00295
(4.07) (-0.24) (1.90) (0.20) (0.70)
D1934 0.00516 -0.00000309 -0.00319 0.0185 0.00953∗
(0.62) (-0.00) (-0.76) (1.49) (1.79)
D1935 -0.0104 -0.0109∗∗ -0.00528 0.00987 -0.00302
(-1.32) (-2.02) (-1.44) (0.86) (-0.91)
Settlement Rate 0.00174 0.00101 0.000345 -0.00105 0.0000838
(1.27) (0.67) (0.31) (-0.77) (0.12)
Settlement Rate*D1932 -0.0000774 -0.00207 -0.000606 -0.00293 -0.000907
(-.05) (-1.09) (-.46) (.1.02) (-1.00)
Settlement Rate*D1933 0.000773 -0.000990 0.00107 0.00688∗∗ 0.00221
(0.18) (-0.50) (0.66) (2.46) (1.35)
Settlement Rate*D1934 -0.00344∗∗ -0.00189 -0.00159 0.0104∗∗∗ -0.000280
(-2.55) (-0.98) (-1.31) (2.60) (-0.24)
Settlement Rate*D1935 -0.000491 -0.000787 -0.000968 0.00509∗ 0.000869
(-0.32) (-0.51) (-0.84) (1.70) (0.90)
Longitude -0.244∗∗∗ -0.0279 0.00804 -0.0276 -0.00208
(-4.19) (-0.90) (0.29) (-0.37) (-0.09)
Latitude 1.470∗∗∗ 0.193 -0.0650 0.0744 -0.0130
(4.30) (1.04) (-0.41) (0.17) (-0.09)
Longitude × Latitude -0.0374∗∗∗ -0.00505 0.00171 -0.00180 0.00032
(-4.28) (-1.07) (0.42) (-0.16) (0.09)
Altitude -0.0000345 -0.00000508 -0.0000195∗ -0.0000319 -0.0000151
(-1.42) (-0.60) (-1.82) (-1.29) (-1.57)
Constant 9.445∗∗∗ 0.971 -0.376 0.944 0.0627
(4.18) (0.81) (-0.35) (0.32) (0.07)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Unionization rate ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Expropriable area ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Anarchist union×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Grandee aristocracy×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income inequality×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income per hectare×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 16,644 16,644 16,644 16,644 16,644
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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I Regression output underlying Figure 9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
Log Pop1930 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.00789∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗ 0.00683∗∗∗
(3.82) (7.00) (6.09) (5.20) (4.64)
Wheat Yield 0.0514∗∗ 0.00777 0.00338 0.0417∗ 0.00156
(2.32) (0.88) (0.43) (1.97) (0.14)
D1932 -0.00881 -0.0118∗∗ -0.00453 -0.00000232 -0.00279
(-1.01) (-2.21) (-1.04) (-0.00) (-0.86)
D1933 0.0540∗∗∗ -0.00195 0.0138∗∗ 0.0135 0.00281
(4.33) (-0.32) (2.40) (1.49) (0.69)
D1934 -0.000788 -0.00344 -0.00667∗ 0.0200∗ 0.00484
(-0.11) (-0.67) (-1.90) (1.78) (1.04)
D1935 -0.0127∗ -0.0142∗∗∗ -0.00836∗∗ 0.0156 -0.00400
(-1.78) (-2.95) (-2.44) (1.55) (-1.30)
Settlers per hec -0.00101 -0.00687 -0.00205 -0.00770 -0.00789∗∗∗
(-0.16) (-0.91) (-0.33) (-0.89) (-2.69)
Settlers per hec*D1932 -0.0000697 0.00654 0.00423 -0.0199 0.000166
(-0.01) (0.70) (0.45) (-1.40) (0.04)
Settlers per hec*D1933 0.00207 0.00389 0.00418 0.0443∗∗ 0.0337∗∗
(0.09) (0.38) (0.39) (2.24) (2.32)
Settlers per hec*D1934 -0.00142 -0.00785 -0.00493 0.0806∗∗∗ 0.0170∗
(-0.14) (-0.80) (-0.69) (2.99) (1.91)
Settlers per hec*D1935 0.00608 0.00940 -0.00280 0.0223 0.0202∗∗∗
(0.70) (1.26) (-0.42) (1.50) (2.63)
Caceres=1 0.0199∗∗ -0.00930∗∗∗ 0.0172∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗
(2.47) (-2.73) (4.65) (2.97) (4.71)
Longitude -0.174∗∗∗ -0.0174 0.00699 -0.0465 -0.0132
(-3.54) (-0.65) (0.30) (-0.71) (-0.60)
Latitude 1.029∗∗∗ 0.129 -0.0649 0.207 0.0552
(3.52) (0.80) (-0.47) (0.54) (0.42)
Altitude -0.0000310 -0.0000104 -0.0000180∗ -0.0000483∗∗ -0.0000226∗∗
(-1.46) (-1.30) (-1.91) (-2.13) (-2.34)
Longitude × Latitude -0.0261∗∗∗ -0.00335 0.00170 -0.00513 -0.00139
(-3.49) (-0.82) (0.48) (-0.52) (-0.41)
Constant 6.760∗∗∗ 0.591 -0.322 1.627 0.475
(3.54) (0.57) (-0.35) (0.64) (0.56)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Unionization rate ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Expropriable area ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Anarchist union×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Grandee aristocracy×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income inequality×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income per hectare×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 16,644 16,644 16,644 16,644 16,644
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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J Regression output main regressions using equation [1]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
Log Pop1930 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.00829∗∗∗ 0.0199∗∗∗ 0.00709∗∗∗
(3.71) (6.08) (5.03) (4.09) (3.49)
Wheat Yield 0.0434 0.0207∗ 0.00864 0.0394 -0.00639
(1.57) (1.82) (0.73) (1.34) (-0.40)
D1932 -0.00626 -0.000820 0.00172 -0.0306∗ -0.0131∗
(-0.57) (-0.07) (0.16) (-1.77) (-1.95)
D1933 0.0273 0.0210 0.0176 -0.0149 0.0129
(1.42) (1.53) (1.24) (-0.78) (1.24)
D1934 0.0124 -0.0109 -0.00405 0.00980 -0.00402
(1.55) (-0.99) (-0.40) (0.50) (-0.61)
D1935 0.00483 0.00684 -0.00654 0.0237 -0.0107
(0.54) (0.64) (-0.66) (1.37) (-1.32)
Treated 0.00926 0.00577 0.00426 -0.00443 -0.00544∗
(1.56) (0.80) (0.79) (-0.66) (-1.90)
Treated=1*D1932 -0.00727 -0.00953 -0.00466 -0.0204 -0.00241
(-0.84) (-1.08) (-0.73) (-1.38) (-0.60)
Treated=1*D1933 0.00900 -0.00876 0.0000992 0.0332∗∗ 0.0168∗∗
(0.57) (-0.96) (0.01) (2.36) (2.17)
Treated=1*D1934 -0.0130∗∗ -0.0109 -0.00960 0.0344∗∗ 0.0103∗∗
(-1.99) (-1.26) (-1.58) (2.33) (2.34)
Treated=1*D1935 -0.00773 -0.00336 -0.00685 0.0164 0.00855∗∗
(-1.11) (-0.45) (-1.19) (1.45) (2.08)
Cáceres=1 0.0184∗ -0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0171∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0242∗∗∗
(1.91) (-4.54) (3.50) (3.11) (3.77)
Longitude -0.133∗∗ -0.0155 -0.00556 -0.0829 0.00563
(-2.20) (-0.50) (-0.19) (-1.05) (0.19)
Latitude 0.814∗∗ 0.163 0.0256 0.407 -0.0644
(2.29) (0.86) (0.15) (0.85) (-0.36)
Longitude × Latitude -0.0208∗∗ -0.00417 -0.000665 -0.0102 0.00165
(-2.29) (-0.87) (-0.15) (-0.83) (0.36)
Altitude -0.00000683 -0.0000107 -0.0000208 -0.0000513 -0.0000191
(-0.25) (-0.93) (-1.65) (-1.62) (-1.43)
Constant 5.070∗∗ 0.479 0.139 3.068 -0.252
(2.17) (0.40) (0.12) (1.01) (-0.22)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Unionization rate ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Expropriable area ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Anarchist union×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Grandee aristocracy×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income inequality×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income per hectare×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 9,291 9,291 9,291 9,291 9,291
r2 0.047 0.052 0.018 0.068 0.025
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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K Regression output main regressions using equation [2]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
Log Pop1930 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.00824∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗ 0.00652∗∗∗
(3.82) (6.22) (5.06) (4.11) (3.40)
Wheat Yield 0.0439 0.0213∗ 0.00855 0.0381 -0.00765
(1.60) (1.94) (0.73) (1.32) (-0.48)
D1932 -0.00450 -0.00350 0.000495 -0.0259 -0.0119∗
(-0.43) (-0.29) (0.05) (-1.50) (-1.85)
D1933 0.0223 0.0181 0.0141 -0.0161 0.00676
(1.20) (1.34) (1.01) (-0.87) (0.70)
D1934 0.0111 -0.0107 -0.00461 -0.000730 -0.00658
(1.40) (-0.97) (-0.48) (-0.04) (-1.03)
D1935 0.00282 0.00355 -0.00655 0.0158 -0.0132
(0.31) (0.34) (-0.66) (0.97) (-1.64)
Treated 0.0152∗∗ 0.0138 0.00778 0.00196 -0.00202
(2.01) (1.43) (1.26) (0.28) (-0.82)
Treated=1*D1932 -0.00127 -0.0187∗ -0.00883 -0.00452 0.00159
(-0.11) (-1.66) (-1.24) (-0.25) (0.32)
Treated=1*D1933 -0.00808 -0.0188 -0.0119 0.0289 -0.00413
(-0.44) (-1.64) (-1.38) (1.64) (-0.79)
Treated=1*D1934 -0.0176∗∗ -0.0101 -0.0115 -0.00144 0.00151
(-2.39) (-0.86) (-1.61) (-0.13) (0.34)
Treated=1*D1935 -0.0146∗ -0.0146 -0.00688 -0.0105 -0.0000755
(-1.84) (-1.45) (-0.97) (-1.00) (-0.03)
Prefect =1 -0.0156∗ -0.0209∗ -0.00813 -0.0113 -0.00435
(-1.65) (-1.82) (-0.87) (-1.23) (-1.17)
Prefect =1*D1932 -0.0143 0.0218 0.00998 -0.0379∗∗ -0.00956∗∗
(-1.27) (1.64) (0.87) (-2.13) (-1.98)
Prefect=1*D1933 0.0408∗ 0.0239∗ 0.0287∗∗ 0.0103 0.0500∗∗∗
(1.71) (1.89) (2.13) (0.41) (3.53)
Prefect=1*D1934 0.0111 -0.00193 0.00459 0.0858∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗
(0.99) (-0.14) (0.43) (3.60) (2.37)
Prefect=1*D1935 0.0164 0.0268∗∗ 0.0000643 0.0644∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗
(1.32) (2.27) (0.01) (3.39) (2.69)
Cáceres=1 0.0205∗∗ -0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0182∗∗∗
(2.09) (-3.56) (3.22) (2.79) (3.16)
Longitude -0.131∗∗ -0.0133 -0.00589 -0.0875 0.00114
(-2.16) (-0.44) (-0.20) (-1.11) (0.04)
Latitude 0.803∗∗ 0.148 0.0277 0.438 -0.0346
(2.25) (0.82) (0.16) (0.92) (-0.21)
Longitude × Latitude -0.0205∗∗ -0.00379 -0.000721 -0.0110 0.000876
(-2.24) (-0.82) (-0.16) (-0.90) (0.20)
Altitude -0.00000766 -0.0000118 -0.0000206∗ -0.0000489 -0.0000167
(-0.29) (-1.05) (-1.67) (-1.59) (-1.25)
Constant 5.008∗∗ 0.394 0.153 3.258 -0.0693
(2.13) (0.34) (0.13) (1.07) (-0.07)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Unionization rate ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Expropriable area ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Anarchist union×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Grandee aristocracy×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income inequality×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income per hectare×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 9,291 9,291 9,291 9,291 9,291
r2 0.048 0.053 0.019 0.073 0.032
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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L Regression output main regressions using intensive margin,
settlers (asinh)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
Log Pop1930 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.00807∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗ 0.00689∗∗∗
(3.67) (5.95) (4.85) (3.98) (3.43)
Wheat Yield 0.0421 0.0210∗ 0.00886 0.0375 -0.00662
(1.56) (1.85) (0.76) (1.31) (-0.42)
D1932 -0.00719 -0.000628 0.00200 -0.0311∗ -0.0131∗∗
(-0.66) (-0.05) (0.19) (-1.80) (-1.99)
D1933 0.0297 0.0221 0.0181 -0.0176 0.0139
(1.57) (1.63) (1.28) (-0.92) (1.31)
D1934 0.0125 -0.0106 -0.00346 0.01000 -0.00287
(1.56) (-0.97) (-0.34) (0.51) (-0.42)
D1935 0.00405 0.00865 -0.00577 0.0234 -0.0113
(0.45) (0.81) (-0.58) (1.36) (-1.41)
settlers (asinh) 0.00198∗ 0.00149 0.00124 -0.000745 -0.000733
(1.80) (1.13) (1.27) (-0.67) (-1.63)
settlers (asinh)*D1932 -0.00104 -0.00185 -0.000968 -0.00362 -0.000456
(-0.67) (-1.17) (-0.82) (-1.34) (-0.68)
settlers (asinh)*D1933 0.000846 -0.00201 -0.000144 0.00716∗∗∗ 0.00280∗∗
(0.31) (-1.24) (-0.10) (2.73) (2.17)
settlers (asinh)*D1934 -0.00246∗∗ -0.00216 -0.00200∗ 0.00638∗∗ 0.00153∗∗
(-2.08) (-1.36) (-1.86) (2.54) (2.18)
settlers (asinh)*D1935 -0.00118 -0.00126 -0.00155 0.00317 0.00182∗∗
(-0.88) (-0.94) (-1.46) (1.53) (2.33)
Cáceres=1 0.0176∗ -0.0184∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0352∗∗∗ 0.0236∗∗∗
(1.84) (-4.70) (3.35) (2.99) (3.71)
Longitude -0.129∗∗ -0.0145 -0.00306 -0.0769 0.00769
(-2.15) (-0.47) (-0.10) (-0.99) (0.26)
Latitude 0.795∗∗ 0.157 0.0124 0.376 -0.0751
(2.25) (0.83) (0.07) (0.80) (-0.42)
Longitude × Latitude -0.0203∗∗ -0.00403 -0.000333 -0.00942 0.00192
(-2.25) (-0.84) (-0.07) (-0.78) (0.42)
Altitude -0.00000523 -0.0000108 -0.0000205 -0.0000489 -0.0000185
(-0.20) (-0.92) (-1.65) (-1.56) (-1.40)
Constant 4.926∗∗ 0.438 0.0400 2.837 -0.333
(2.12) (0.36) (0.03) (0.94) (-0.30)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Unionization rate ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Expropriable area ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Anarchist union×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Grandee aristocracy×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income inequality×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income per hectare×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 9,291 9,291 9,291 9,291 9,291
r2 0.047 0.052 0.018 0.069 0.025
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
57
M Regression output main regressions using intensive margin,
settlers’ratio (asinh)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
Log Pop1930 0.0140∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.00809∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.00621∗∗∗
(3.19) (4.68) (4.84) (2.86) (2.74)
Wheat Yield 0.0568 0.0317∗∗ 0.0169 0.0209 -0.0300∗
(1.64) (2.22) (1.11) (0.56) (-1.90)
D1932 -0.0233∗ 0.00425 0.000859 -0.0421∗∗ -0.0157∗∗
(-1.96) (0.30) (0.07) (-2.19) (-2.02)
D1933 0.0361 0.0197 0.00475 -0.0288 0.00830
(1.52) (1.24) (0.32) (-1.42) (0.62)
D1934 0.00775 -0.0110 -0.00761 0.00193 -0.00477
(0.88) (-0.79) (-0.59) (0.08) (-0.53)
D1935 -0.00341 0.0113 -0.0101 0.0167 -0.0141
(-0.35) (0.96) (-0.84) (0.79) (-1.43)
Settlement Rate 0.00219 0.00184 0.0000425 -0.00245 -0.00110
(1.26) (0.96) (0.03) (-1.43) (-1.40)
Settlement Rate*D1932 -0.000257 -0.00228 0.000217 -0.00155 -0.000502
(-0.12) (-0.95) (0.13) (-0.45) (-0.51)
Settlement Rate*D1933 -0.000342 -0.00223 0.00257 0.00731∗∗ 0.00363∗
(-0.09) (-0.96) (1.32) (2.11) (1.80)
Settlement Rate*D1934 -0.00313∗∗ -0.00200 -0.00131 0.00949∗∗ 0.00212∗
(-2.03) (-0.82) (-0.86) (2.56) (1.87)
Settlement Rate*D1935 -0.000868 -0.00134 -0.000896 0.00557∗ 0.00222∗
(-0.45) (-0.70) (-0.62) (1.75) (1.87)
Cáceres=1 0.0194∗ -0.0219∗∗∗ 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.0412∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗
(1.67) (-5.10) (3.42) (3.11) (3.67)
Longitude -0.205∗∗∗ -0.0248 0.00258 -0.0777 0.0358
(-2.70) (-0.65) (0.07) (-0.73) (1.06)
Latitude 1.254∗∗∗ 0.232 -0.0196 0.344 -0.249
(2.77) (1.02) (-0.09) (0.53) (-1.21)
Longitude × Latitude -0.0321∗∗∗ -0.00597 0.000504 -0.00859 0.00630
(-2.77) (-1.03) (0.09) (-0.52) (1.19)
Altitude -0.00000569 -0.00000243 -0.0000259∗ -0.0000370 -0.00000672
(-0.19) (-0.19) (-1.81) (-1.03) (-0.50)
Constant 7.867∗∗∗ 0.820 -0.193 2.945 -1.398
(2.67) (0.56) (-0.13) (0.72) (-1.08)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Unionization rate ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Expropriable area ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Anarchist union×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Grandee aristocracy×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income inequality×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income per hectare×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 9,291 9,291 9,291 9,291 9,291
r2 0.047 0.055 0.022 0.079 0.026
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
58
N Regression output main regressions using intensive margin,
settlers per hec (asinh)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
Log Pop1930 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.00831∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.00662∗∗∗
(3.91) (6.14) (5.12) (4.11) (3.49)
Wheat Yield 0.0408 0.0201∗ 0.00845 0.0440 -0.00304
(1.46) (1.74) (0.71) (1.45) (-0.19)
D1932 -0.0102 -0.00810 -0.00255 -0.0332∗ -0.0137∗∗
(-0.94) (-0.68) (-0.24) (-1.79) (-2.17)
D1933 0.0309 0.0158 0.0170 -0.0102 0.0105
(1.63) (1.22) (1.20) (-0.54) (1.02)
D1934 0.00369 -0.0149 -0.00681 0.00231 -0.00557
(0.44) (-1.36) (-0.68) (0.13) (-0.84)
D1935 -0.00246 0.00204 -0.00822 0.0246 -0.0130
(-0.26) (0.20) (-0.79) (1.37) (-1.63)
Settlers per hec -0.00606 -0.00577 0.00107 -0.0120 -0.0111∗∗∗
(-0.79) (-0.54) (0.12) (-1.03) (-2.87)
Settlers per hec*D1932 -0.0000124 0.00871 0.00720 -0.0343∗ -0.00276
(-0.00) (0.67) (0.55) (-1.74) (-0.63)
Settlers per hec*D1933 0.00528 0.00211 0.00293 0.0546∗∗ 0.0468∗∗
(0.20) (0.16) (0.21) (2.21) (2.50)
Settlers per hec*D1934 0.00691 -0.00791 -0.00995 0.107∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗
(0.51) (-0.58) (-0.98) (3.37) (2.77)
Settlers per hec*D1935 0.0128 0.0122 -0.00830 0.0325∗ 0.0284∗∗∗
(1.13) (1.19) (-0.87) (1.71) (2.89)
Cáceres=1 0.0223∗∗ -0.0171∗∗∗ 0.0173∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗
(2.35) (-3.88) (3.54) (2.50) (3.32)
Longitude -0.139∗∗ -0.0145 -0.00559 -0.0921 0.00438
(-2.30) (-0.47) (-0.19) (-1.14) (0.15)
Latitude 0.847∗∗ 0.154 0.0250 0.485 -0.0435
(2.35) (0.81) (0.14) (0.99) (-0.24)
Altitude -0.00000637 -0.0000110 -0.0000208 -0.0000491 -0.0000182
(-0.24) (-0.95) (-1.65) (-1.53) (-1.37)
Longitude × Latitude -0.0216∗∗ -0.00394 -0.000649 -0.0122 0.00110
(-2.35) (-0.81) (-0.15) (-0.98) (0.24)
Constant 5.336∗∗ 0.447 0.142 3.418 -0.210
(2.27) (0.37) (0.13) (1.10) (-0.19)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Unionization rate ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Expropriable area ×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Anarchist union×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Grandee aristocracy×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income inequality×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Income per hectare×Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 9,291 9,291 9,291 9,291 9,291
r2 0.046 0.052 0.018 0.070 0.028
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
59
O Regression output, Fixed Effects regressions, extensive mar-
gin.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
D1932 -0.00180 -0.00830∗∗ -0.000591 0.0189∗∗ 0.00337∗
(-0.44) (-2.06) (-0.23) (2.16) (1.73)
D1933 0.0503∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.00753∗∗∗
(5.53) (-2.22) (2.94) (3.73) (2.90)
D1934 -0.000305 0.000433 -0.00281 0.0126∗∗ 0.00818∗∗∗
(-0.12) (0.10) (-1.09) (2.26) (3.07)
D1935 -0.00753∗∗∗ -0.0229∗∗∗ -0.00632∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗ 0.000242
(-3.09) (-6.27) (-2.83) (2.17) (0.16)
Treated=1*D1932 -0.00551 -0.00990 -0.00420 -0.00964 -0.00305
(-0.92) (-1.51) (-0.82) (-0.91) (-0.90)
Treated=1*D1933 0.0257∗ -0.00781 -0.00239 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗
(1.66) (-1.09) (-0.36) (2.92) (2.32)
Treated=1*D1934 -0.0134∗∗∗ -0.0122∗ -0.00688 0.0356∗∗∗ 0.00148
(-2.82) (-1.89) (-1.42) (2.82) (0.34)
Treated=1*D1935 -0.00278 -0.00790 -0.00626 0.0132 0.00367
(-0.49) (-1.31) (-1.38) (1.34) (1.06)
Constant 0.0872∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.00999 0.00725∗∗
(7.96) (8.01) (3.25) (1.49) (2.10)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 17,043 17,043 17,043 17,043 17,043
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
60
P Regression output, Fixed Effects regressions, extensive mar-
gin and Prefect effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
D1932 -0.00753 -0.0116 -0.00412 0.0152 0.00208
(-1.79) (-3.11) (-1.59) (1.74) (1.10)
D1933 0.0446 -0.0137 0.00786 0.0162 0.00625
(4.83) (-3.31) (2.04) (3.09) (2.40)
D1934 -0.00604 -0.00288 -0.00634 0.00884 0.00689
(-2.23) (-0.66) (-2.56) (1.64) (2.58)
D1935 -0.0133 -0.0262 -0.00985 0.00738 -0.00105
(-4.91) (-9.05) (-4.75) (1.48) (-0.74)
treated=1*D1932 0.0164 -0.000525 0.000451 0.0180 0.00336
(2.51) (-0.10) (0.14) (1.45) (0.86)
treated=1*D1933 0.0234 -0.00266 -0.00731 0.0423 -0.00292
(1.28) (-0.57) (-1.47) (3.03) (-0.77)
treated=1*D1934 -0.00384 0.00716 -0.00236 0.00194 -0.00488
(-1.74) (1.17) (-1.06) (0.24) (-1.31)
treated=1*D1935 0.00421 -0.00176 0.000906 -0.00474 -0.000901
(1.03) (-2.25) (0.41) (-0.80) (-0.63)
treated Gobernador=1*D1932 -0.0222 -0.00519 0.00683 -0.0454 -0.00843
(-3.62) (-0.92) (1.30) (-4.85) (-2.35)
treated Gobernador=1*D1933 0.0340 0.00458 0.0290 -0.00268 0.0451
(1.41) (0.80) (3.70) (-0.14) (4.30)
treated Gobernador=1*D1934 0.00632 -0.0284 0.00711 0.0967 0.0212
(1.21) (-5.45) (1.45) (3.93) (3.32)
treated Gobernador=1*D1935 0.0124 0.00229 0.000989 0.0602 0.0170
(1.50) (2.61) (0.34) (3.31) (3.15)
Constant 0.0872 0.0267 0.0112 0.00999 0.00725
(7.18) (7.06) (3.14) (1.79) (2.06)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 17,043 17,043 17,043 17,043 17,043
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
61
Q Regression output, Fixed Effects regressions, intensive mar-
gin (asinh(Settlers)).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
D1932 -0.00289 -0.00753 -0.000142 0.0159 0.00265
(-0.73) (-1.90) (-0.05) (1.85) (1.39)
D1933 0.0503 -0.00867 0.0116 0.0142 0.00744
(5.56) (-1.89) (3.01) (2.62) (2.83)
D1934 0.000197 0.000877 -0.00234 0.0112 0.00831
(0.08) (0.20) (-0.92) (1.96) (3.15)
D1935 -0.00733 -0.0208 -0.00577 0.00884 -0.000746
(-2.97) (-5.79) (-2.57) (1.73) (-0.51)
settlers (asinh) 0.00272 0.00214 0.00165 0.00180 0.000429
(3.25) (1.96) (2.14) (2.32) (1.30)
settlers (asinh)*D1932 -0.000546 -0.00199 -0.000892 -0.000540 -0.000262
(-0.49) (-1.64) (-0.94) (-0.29) (-0.45)
settlers (asinh)*D1933 0.00444 -0.00199 -0.000501 0.00785 0.00241
(1.66) (-1.56) (-0.43) (3.70) (2.45)
settlers (asinh)*D1934 -0.00251 -0.00228 -0.00136 0.00668 0.000208
(-2.83) (-1.91) (-1.54) (2.69) (0.30)
settlers (asinh)*D1935 -0.000552 -0.00214 -0.00129 0.00312 0.00100
(-0.52) (-1.96) (-1.54) (1.61) (1.59)
Constant 0.0799 0.0210 0.00680 0.00515 0.00609
(7.02) (4.74) (1.85) (0.91) (1.72)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 17,043 17,043 17,043 17,043 17,043
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
62
R Regression output, Fixed Effects regressions, intensive mar-
gin (asinh(Settlement rate)).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
D1932 -0.0000510 -0.00835 -0.000183 0.0164 0.00196
(-0.01) (-1.85) (-0.06) (1.59) (0.94)
D1933 0.0607 -0.0112 0.00850 0.0191 0.00715
(5.74) (-2.28) (2.08) (3.03) (2.50)
D1934 0.00243 -0.000325 -0.00254 0.0126 0.00893
(0.86) (-0.06) (-0.86) (1.85) (2.92)
D1935 -0.00702 -0.0229 -0.00663 0.00899 -0.000520
(-2.83) (-5.65) (-2.61) (1.47) (-0.30)
Settlement Rate 0.00315 0.00208 0.00136 0.00101 0.000646
(2.56) (1.36) (1.32) (0.95) (1.21)
Settlement Rate*D1932 -0.000104 -0.00251 -0.000627 0.0000424 -0.000318
(-0.07) (-1.43) (-0.49) (0.02) (-0.38)
Settlement Rate*D1933 0.00390 -0.00160 0.000500 0.00903 0.00295
(0.95) (-0.90) (0.32) (3.14) (1.99)
Settlement Rate*D1934 -0.00326 -0.00223 -0.00148 0.0102 -0.000321
(-2.77) (-1.28) (-1.30) (2.58) (-0.31)
Settlement Rate*D1935 0.0000406 -0.00208 -0.00128 0.00559 0.000764
(0.03) (-1.36) (-1.20) (1.84) (0.85)
Constant 0.0840 0.0233 0.00498 0.00713 0.00652
(6.29) (4.66) (1.54) (1.12) (1.65)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 17,043 17,043 17,043 17,043 17,043
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
63
S Regression output, Fixed Effects regressions, intensive mar-
gin (asinh(Settlers per hectare)).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invasions Strikes Clashes Theft Attacks
Log Pop1930 0.0156 0.0131 0.00513 0.0266 0.00488
(6.35) (10.71) (5.23) (5.22) (4.50)
Wheat Yield 0.0246 -0.0136 0.0113 0.0272 0.0115
(2.61) (-3.00) (2.28) (1.78) (2.29)
D1932 -0.00407 -0.0139 -0.00364 0.0203 0.00172
(-1.03) (-3.63) (-1.31) (2.63) (0.90)
D1933 0.0587 -0.0145 0.00970 0.0273 0.00617
(6.90) (-3.37) (2.57) (4.63) (2.08)
D1934 -0.00679 -0.00302 -0.00582 0.0135 0.00467
(-2.48) (-0.72) (-2.22) (2.07) (1.77)
D1935 -0.0112 -0.0280 -0.00873 0.0127 -0.00282
(-4.10) (-8.10) (-3.54) (2.32) (-1.71)
Settlers per hec 0.00287 -0.00791 0.00388 0.0000673 -0.00232
(0.67) (-1.10) (0.74) (0.01) (-1.37)
Settlers per hec*D1932 -0.000680 0.00352 0.00437 -0.0212 0.000944
(-0.10) (0.41) (0.51) (-1.68) (0.24)
Settlers per hec*D1933 0.0145 0.000829 0.00200 0.0404 0.0350
(0.70) (0.09) (0.20) (2.23) (2.56)
Settlers per hec*D1934 -0.000393 -0.00878 -0.00425 0.0730 0.0159
(-0.04) (-0.97) (-0.66) (3.02) (1.93)
Settlers per hec*D1935 0.00929 0.00511 -0.00319 0.0208 0.0196
(1.11) (0.65) (-0.53) (1.55) (2.64)
Constant -0.0848 -0.0431 -0.0527 -0.253 -0.0546
(-2.83) (-2.80) (-3.77) (-4.14) (-3.63)
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 17,043 17,043 17,043 17,043 17,043
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
64
